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INTRODUCTION
Computers and computer software constitute an undisputedly sig-
nificant part of our economy as we enter the third millennium.'
1 For example, the Information Technology Industry Council, a consortium of 30
computer and information-technology companies, accounted for 16% of all industry-
funded research in 1996, had revenues in excess of $405 billion during that year, and
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Scholars and government agencies alike, however, struggle to deter-
mine the proper form of intellectual property protection for com-
puter software.2 Likewise, software developers themselves are unsure
about how to most effectively protect their inventions.3 Much of the
uncertainty stems from the historical ambivalence of the courts and
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) toward
software patents.4 Specifically, two amorphous, judicially created ex-
ceptions to patentable subject matter, the business method exception 5
and the mathematical algorithm exception,6 have prevented consis-
tent and effective enforcement of patent protection for software-re-
lated inventions. 7 This Note avers that despite past uncertainty, the
patent system remains the best form of protection for software-related
inventions. 8 In addition, this Note considers two modifications to the
current patent system that might further facilitate the efficient protec-
tion of software-related inventions.
In its landmark decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-
ture Financial Group, Inc.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") purported to clarify the confusing
status of software patents wrought by longstanding judicial application
of the mathematical algorithm and business method exceptions.' 0
The opinion emphatically reaffirmed an earlier holding by the court
that the mathematical algorithm exception does not apply to software
as long as the software produces "a 'useful, concrete and tangible re-
sult""' through "the transformation of data.., by a machine through
a series of mathematical calculations.' 2 Moreover, the Federal Cir-
cuit in State Street Bank elected to "take [the] opportunity to lay [the]
employed more than 1.5 million people. See About 1TI (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://
www.itic.org/about_iti/index.html>.
2 See infra Part IlA (describing the relative strengths and weaknesses of several dif-
ferent forms of intellectual property protection).
3 See Shawn McDonald, Patenting "oppy Disks, or How the Federal Circuit's Acquiescence
Has Filed the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 V.J.L & TECH. 9,11 5-10 (Fall 1998) <http:/
/vjoltstudentvirginia.edu/graphics/vol3/hom_art9.html> (observing how the lack of
consistent patent protection has driven software developers to seek shelter under trade
secrecy and copyright doctrines and describing the shortcomings thereof).
4 See infra Part I.B-C (documenting the courts' historical rejection of software patents
under mathematical algorithm and business method exceptions).
5 For a detailed discussion of the business method exception, see infra Part I.C.
6 For a detailed discussion of the mathematical algorithm exception, see infra Part
I.B.
7 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
516 (D. Mass. 1996) (using the business method and mathematical algorithm exceptions to
invalidate a patent on a computer system to manage a financial services configuration),
rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
8 See infra Part HI.A-B.
9 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denie, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
1O See id. at 1373-77.
"1 Id. at 1373 (quoting In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
12 Id.
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ill-conceived [business method] exception to rest,"13 and held that the
exception was born in dicta, had never attained the status of binding
precedent, and thus should never have precluded patent protection
for any inventions. 14 By abolishing the business method exception
and limiting the mathematical algorithm exception, the Federal Cir-
cuit sought to promote a new era of certainty in software patentability.
State Street Bank established the viability of the current patent system as
a vehicle to protect software-related intellectual property. In addition,
the decision may serve as a guide for congressional amendment of the
Patent Act,15 which would enhance the patent system's ability to prop-
erly protect software-related inventions. 16
Some commentators argue that a major overhaul of the Patent
Act is necessary to provide proper software protection; they assert that
the Act's current incarnation is ill-equipped to address the various nu-
ances unique to the field of software patents.17 Under this view, even
the State Street Bank decision fails to harmonize the current patent sys-
tem with software-related inventions. Still other commentators reject
the entire patent system itself as a viable source of protection for
software-related inventions and advocate alternative means of software
protection.' 8 Some suggest copyright and trademark doctrines as po-
tential candidates for this role. 19 Others call for a sui generis system
of protection specifically for software.20
This Note argues that State Street Bank has firmly established the
current patent system as the best method to protect software-related
inventions, despite the historical shortcomings of the patent system in
13 Id. at 1375.
14 See id. at 1375-77.
15 Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-
376 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
16 For amendments to the Patent Act that this Note considers, see infra Part llI.B.
17 See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 3, 1 123 (noting that "the current patent statute is
woefully inadequate for the protection of computer software" and arguing that "[t]he pol-
icy decisions inherent in protecting software are simply too complicated to allow adequate
solution through the [Federal Circuit's] legislating from the bench").
18 For a discussion of these contentions, see infra Part IIIA.
19 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Hiv. L. Rnv. 977, 1072-73
(1993) (arguing that copyright offers the ideal form of intellectual property protection for
software); Lauren Fisher Kellner, Comment, Trade Dress Protection for Computer User Inteface
"Look and Feel," 61 U. CH. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (1994) ("Where copyright law has failed to
protect user interfaces, trademark law might succeed.").
20 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2310-15 (1994) (criticizing the effectiveness of
current intellectual property protection systems and recommending a new form of protec-
tion for computer software); Richard H. Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994
in the Federal Circuit Patent Law Needs a Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 167, 213
(1994) (proposing a "petty-patent system [that] would effectively supersede patent protec-
tion for all computer-related questionable statutory subject matter, whether called an al-
gorithm, method of doing business, printed matter, or an abstract idea").
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this arena. The Federal Circuit's State Street Bank decision created a
new paradigm for software patents, in which the requirements for a
software patent parallel those for traditional patents. This Note fur-
ther suggests two amendments to the Patent Act, which would allow
the current patent system to more easily embrace software-related in-
ventions. Admittedly, a legislative overhaul of the Patent Act is long
overdue;2 ' however, the State Street Bank decision provides a much
needed guide for Congress to use to renovate the Act to accommo-
date the idiosyncrasies of software-related inventions. 22
Part I of this Note traces the background of software patentability
jurisprudence, including the mathematical algorithm and business
method exceptions. Part II analyzes the Federal Circuit's holding and
rationale in State Street Bank and discusses the likely impact of the deci-
sion on the field of software patents. Part III explains why, in light of
State Street Bank, the patent system has emerged as the optimum form
of protection for software. Part Ill also discusses two amendments to
the Patent Act for more efficient protection of software-related inven-
tions by the patent system.
I
BACKGROUND
Although patents have been part of the American legal landscape
since the nation's inception,23 at least one area of patent law remains
highly unsettled: whether and under what conditions computer
software is patentable. Computer software and related technology fac-
tor heavily into today's economy;24 one could convincingly argue that
21 The current Patent Act has not substantially changed since 1952. Congress could
not have foreseen the range of technologies that have emerged since then, nor could it
have anticipated the issues now facing the Patent Office.
22 For a discussion of State Street Bank's impact on software patent jurisprudence, see
infra Part II.B.
23 The Constitution authorizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress passed
the first patent statute in 1790, before the passage of the Bill of Rights. SeeAct of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). In fact, the rationale underlying the U.S. patent
system dates back to before the 1790s. The United States adopted many of the principles
of English patent laws, which stemmed from the 1623 Statute of Monopolies. See 1 DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL=r, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT at OV-3 n.2 (1999). The Statute of Monopolies allowed a fourteen-year
grant of "letters patents" for "new manufactures," a practice that forms the basis of the
current patent monopoly. Id. (citation omitted). The modern patent term in the United
States lasts 20 years from the date of application. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a) (2) (1994). For a
historical overview of the development of U.S. patent law, see I CHIsuM, supra, at OV-2 to
OV-15.
24 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Information Technology Industry Council in Support of
Defendant-Appellant Signature Financial Group, Inc. at 13-14, State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (No. 96-1327) [hereinafter ITIC
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information technology drives modem society.25 Thus, it is in soci-
ety's best interest to encourage the continued growth and vitality of
the computer software industry. A large software developer typically
spends millions of dollars annually on research and development and
must rely on a form of market advantage in order to recoup this in-
vestment.26 Congress envisioned the patent system as a tool to pro-
vide just this sort of incentive to inventors. 27 However, because of
Amicus Brief] (noting that, as of 1996, 1331 patents covering business-related software had
been issued to "companies that provide a significant percentage of the world gross interna-
tional product," as well as "independent inventor[s]," and arguing that invalidating busi-
ness-related software patents "potentially pulls the rug out from under [these companies
and inventors] and throws an entire industry into chaos"); see also Mark A. Lemley & David
W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REv. 255, 262 (1997) (discussing the
importance of software in today's society and noting that "[t]elevision sets may incorporate
25,000 lines of software, and even a simple electric shaver can embed 100 lines" and
"[plower trains in new General Motors cars contain roughly 30,000 lines of code" (foot-
note omitted)).
25 The growth of the Internet reflects the increased prominence of computers and
related technology in modem American society. According to a recent Nielsen survey,
from January 1997 through June 1998, "'the number of Internet users increased at a ro-
bust compounded rate of 2.5 percent a month... [and] the number of on-line buyers
increased even more dramatically.'" Nielsen Media Research, Number ofInternet Users and
Shoppers Surges in United States and Canada (Aug. 24, 1998) <http://
www.nielsenmedia.com/newsreleases/commnet2.hml>. "From September through June
1998, the growth in on-line buyers accelerated to 8 percent a month.'" Id. The same study
found that, for the first time in history, over fifty percent of all Americans aged 16-34 use
the Interet. See id. Viewed over a broader span of time, the growth is even more remarka-
ble. For example, in June 1993, 130 web sites existed on the Intemet; by February 1999,
the total had grown to 4,301,512, an increase of over three million percent in less than six
years. See Robert H'obbes' Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v.0 (visited Jan. 19, 2000)
<http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Interet/History/HIT.html>.
26 See ITIC Amicus Brief, supra note 24, at 7-8 ("[P]rudent investors demand patent
protection for new computer-related inventions before placing their risk capital into a new
venture." (footnote omitted)); Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 24, at 267 (comparing the
construction of a 12-meter yacht to compete in the America's Cup, the construction of a
Formula One race car, and the development of a "software order-entry system," and observ-
ing that all three endeavors carry price tags of over $1 million, "for the same reason: Each
is a custom product designed and constructed manually by skilled and highly paid
craftsmen" (quoting Capers Jones, Economics of Software Reuse, CoMPUTER, July 1994, at 106,
106)); see also David Bender, Recent Developments in Software Patents, in COMPUTER SOFrWARE
PROTEGnON 139, 146 & 215 n.4 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literacy Property
Course Handbook Series No. G-479, 1997) (noting that many companies, ranging in size
from behemoths like IBM to small start-ups, have heavily invested in intellectual property
for software and have depended on patents to protect that property). Bender argues that
securing capital financing depends on the company's ability to obtain an intellectual prop-
erty right such as patent, which justifies the heavy spending on the research and develop-
ment of the software. See id. at 151-52.
27 See In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring).
Judge Newman noted:
Patent law has nicely fostered technological advance in the United States,
for its principles are particularly suited to a free market system: it requires
neither governmental intrusion nor federal funds to provide the incentive
for industrial innovation; the innovation incentive is the direct conse-
quence of the patent grant. I know of no major technological advance, no
new industry or evolving technology, that has not participated in the patent
1122 [Vol. 85:1118
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facial differences between software-related inventions and their more
tangible, traditional counterparts, the patent system has thus far failed
to consistently protect software inventions. 28
Because software-related intellectual property is so valuable, de-
velopers desire the consistent enforcement of patent protection for
software. However, contradictory Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
opinions have created confusion in the area of software patents.29 Fur-
thermore, some commentators have questioned whether the Patent
Act,30 which has remained substantially unchanged since 1952, can
adequately address the new technological and policy issues presented
by software-related inventions.3 '
system. It is estimated that 85-90% of the world's technology is disclosed
only in patent documents.
Id, (Newman, J., concurring).
28 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2361-64. Samuelson and her colleagues ar-
gue that the patent system has vacillated between periods of over- and underprotection:
Concerns about overprotection [of software] contributed to the initial
policy denying patents for software innovations....
... As the software industry became more commercially significant, the
early concerns about possible overprotection . . . subsided and were re-
placed by concerns that the initially constrictive patent policy toward
software innovation might, in fact, underprotect valuable aspects of
programs....
... Because innovation in the software industry is typically incremental,
not inventive [in the sense that tangible inventions are inventive, the patent
system] will inevitably withdraw most patent protection from software and
result in underprotection.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29 See Stern, supra note 20, at 208 ("[Recent Federal Circuit decisions] have left al-
gorithm-related and computer-related patent law in such disarray that... it may be years
before any equilibrium is reached. The outcome of cases will now significantly depend on
the happenstance of panel composition."). Richard Stern argues that the current level of
uncertainty in software-related patent law is "not acceptable." Id. "It is unfair to the
software industry... upon which patents impact. It is not in the interest of the public that
predictability of commercial affairs, business expectations, and security of investment
should be impaired by this much legal uncertainty." Id. For a discussion of the decisions
that have fragmented software patent jurisprudence into its current state, see infra Part I.B-
C.
30 Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-
376 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
31 See McDonald, supra note 3, 1 2 (arguing that "[t]he fundamental cause of the
unpredictability and inconsistency, which might best be described as 'doctrinal chaos,' of
recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) regarding patent
protection for software inventions is simply that the current patent law was not designed to
provide such protection" (footnote omitted)). Shawn McDonald observed that "[t]he cur-
rent patent statute is based upon the mechanical innovation paradigm of the Industrial
Revolution rather than the algorithmic innovation paradigm of the current Information
Revolution." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of proposed amendments to the
Patent Act, see infra Part III.B. Until Congress updates the Patent Act, the courts' decisions
on software patentability remain the final authority. Indeed, some commentators have
speculated that Congress's creation of the Federal Circuit signaled an abrogation of its
responsibility to update the Patent Act. See McDonald, supra note 3, 1 13 ("The message
2000] 1123
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Under the Judicial Code,32 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit 33 has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases and thus usually serves as the final arbiter with respect to patent
issues. 34 Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion, there is no possibility of a circuit split over patent law issues.
Although the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Federal Cir-
cuit decisions, the Court often abstains from reviewing the Federal
Circuit's patent decisions due to the technical nature of the issues
involved.33
On the rare occasions when the Supreme Court grants certiorari
to hear a patent appeal,36 the Federal Circuit often distinguishes or
completely ignores the resulting decision, even if the precedent ap-
pears directly on point.37 Thus, in practice, the Federal Circuit repre-
sents the final authority on most patent issues.38 As Justice Stevens
lamented, if the judges on the Federal Circuit (or the CCPA before it)
disagree with Supreme Court precedent, they will not hesitate to dis-
tinguish the decision to the point of emasculation, if not ignore it
sent by both the legislative and executive branches in creating the [Federal Circuit] was a
clear and adamant request for judicial activism to take the place of legislative debate and
resolution of patent law doctrine.").
32 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
33 The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over patent cases is the successor to the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). The Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)), merged the CCPA and the appellate jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Claims into the Federal Circuit, which then came into existence on Octo-
ber 1, 1982. See § 402, 96 Stat. at 57.
34 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).
35 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that patent claims covering a computerized accounting
system "are directed to statutory [patentable] subject matter"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093
(1999). In addition, many of the Federal Circuit's decisions are reversals of patent applica-
tion rejections by the PTO Board of Appeals ("Board"). If the Federal Circuit reverses the
Board's decision and validates the patent at issue, that reversal usually becomes the final
disposition of the case. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1536-37 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (re-
versing the Board's rejection of a patent for a "smooth waveform display in a digital oscillo-
scope"); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 903 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (reversing in part the Board's
rejection of a patent covering an improvement in CAT scan imaging technique); In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1238 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (reversing the Board's rejection of a patent
covering "a system for typesetting alphanumeric information, using a computer-based con-
trol system in conjunction with a phototypesetter of conventional design").
36 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S 175, 192-93 (1981) (affirming the CCPA's deci-
sion and validating a patent that covered a process for curing rubber); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 593-96 (1978) (reversing the CCPA's decision and invalidating a patent that
claimed a process for updating alarm limits in catalytic converters).
37 For a discussion of the CCPA's dismissal of the Supreme Court's holding in Rook,
see infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
38 The Supreme Court has even adopted the rationale of the lower court in later
cases. For instance, after the CCPA heavily criticized the "point of novelty" approach
employed by the Supreme Court in M/ok, the Supreme Court rejected the approach in its
subsequent Diehr decision. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
1124 [Vol. 85:1118
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outright.3 9 Current software patentability doctrine is thus the result of
an amalgam of contradictory Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
cases. Not surprisingly, the law governing software patents has devel-
oped unevenly, causing great confusion.40
Before the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,41 inventors faced two substantial
hurdles in their attempts to obtain patent protection for software in-
ventions. The first hurdle, the mathematical algorithm exception to
patentability, reflects the Supreme Court's concern for the progress of
technology. The Court feared that allowing an inventor to patent an
abstract mathematical principle, as opposed to a specific application
of that principle, could preclude other inventors from using that prin-
ciple in other ways.42 The exception poses a significant hurdle to
software patents, because virtually all software utilizes mathematical
algorithms to accomplish its intended function.43
Similarly, the business method exception to patentability prohib-
its inventors from patenting methods of doing business.44 The term,
"methods of doing business," has been applied broadly by courts, who,
under its aegis, have purportedly invalidated patents covering inven-
tions as diverse as bookkeeping systems 45 and drive-in movie thea-
ters.46 This exception poses a problem for software developers,
because many software programs primarily implement novel methods
39 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens chastised the
CCPA for its disregard of the Supreme Court's rationale in Parker v. fook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978):
[The CCPA] construed Rook as resting on nothing more than the way in
which the patent claims had been drafted, and it expressly declined to use
the method of claim analysis spelled out in that decision.... [The CCPA's]
reading of Flook-although entirely consistent with the lower court's expan-
sive approach to § 101 during the past 12 years-trivializes the holding in
Fook, the principle that underlies [Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)],
and the settled line of authority reviewed in those opinions.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 For a discussion of this development, see infra Part I.B-C.
41 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
42 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (relying on prior decisions which
held that scientific principles and laws of nature could not be patented to decide the pat-
entability of mathematical algorithms and explaining that "[p]henomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patent-
able, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work"). For a discussion of
the genesis and subsequent development of the mathematical algorithm exception, see
infra Part I.B.
43 See Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and Software Technologies: The Effect of
the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and Lowry on the Claiming of Mathemati-
calAlgorithms and Data Structures, 45 Burr. L. Rnv. 457, 461 (1997) ("All computer program-
related inventions are algorithms.").
44 For a detailed discussion of the business method exception, see Part I.C.
45 See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
46 See Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 551-53
(1st Cir. 1949).
20001 1125
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of doing business. 47 Aggravating these problems was the fact that,
prior to State Street Bank, courts had applied a variety of tests to deter-
mine whether a patent claim fell within either or both of these excep-
tions.48 The inconsistent application of the two judicial exceptions
has resulted in a patchwork of fact-specific decisions, creating confu-
sion among courts and practitioners alike.49
A. Statutory Subject Matter
The power of Congress to establish a patent system arises out of
the Constitution.50 The original justification for the U.S. patent sys-
tem was not the inherent entitlement of inventors to the exclusive use
of their inventions, but the provision of economic incentive. 51 The
proponents of the patent system reasoned that if the government
granted inventors limited monopolies on the use of their inventions,
inventors would have greater incentive to invent than if others could
legally copy and subsequently undersell their inventions.5 2 Thus, the
primary goal of U.S. patent law is to stimulate the advancement of
technology via economic incentive. 55 Accordingly, the current patent
47 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504
(D. Mass. 1996) (invalidating under the business method exception a patent that covered
"'a data processing system and method for... maintaining a partnership portfolio and
partner fund (Hub and Spoke) financial services configuration'" (quoting U.S. Patent No.
5,193,056)), rev'm 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
48 See infra Part I.B (discussing the various manifestations of the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test and the physical transformation test, all formulated to determine whether the pres-
ence of a mathematical algorithm removed an invention from the realm of patentable
subject matter).
49 See Lawrence Kass, Comment, Computer Software Patentability and the Role of Means-
Plus-Function Format in Computer Software Claims, 15 PACE L. REV. 787, 789-91 (1995).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51 Under traditional analysis, allowing inventors exclusive use of their inventions stim-
ulates invention. See Bender, supra note 26, at 151 ("The underlying philosophy of United
States IP [Intellectual Property] law is that providing a degree of exclusivity will stimulate
the incentive to create IP.").
52 The inventor must generally charge a higher price for a new piece of software than
would competitors who had simply copied the inventor's innovation. This price differen-
tial reflects the research and development costs of the inventor. The absence of market
protection for the invention in the form of a limited monopoly on the invention would
negate all incentive to innovate. See id. at 151-52 ("A useful software package usually has a
development cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not millions. Absent a chance to
recoup that investment, developers will have no incentive to develop, and investors no
incentive to fund.").
53 Professor Chiappetta describes the rationale behind the Patent Clause:
An incentive in the form of a limited right to preclude competition could
be offered to inventors to encourage the investment of their time and re-
sources in inventive endeavors which would progress the useful arts. The
hope was that this encouragement would result in the desired growth in the
useful arts which, in turn, would result in overall economic growth and a
general increase in prosperity.
1126 [Vol. 85:1118
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statute requires that all patentable inventions be truly novel, 54 nonob-
vious,55 and useful,5 6 and that the inventor's patent application dis-
close enough information to enable another to improve upon the
invention and practice the invention upon expiration of the patent
monopoly.57
Congress historically has taken an expansive view of the patenta-
bility of new inventions. The 1790 Act 58 authorized a patent for "any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improve-
ment therein not before known or used," so long as the invention was
"sufficiently useful and important."59 In 1793, Congress modified the
categories of patentable subject matter to include "any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement [thereof]."6O The broad categories established by
the 1793 Act largely remain intact to this day.61 Thus, to reside within
the domain of "statutory subject matter," an invention must fall into
one of the following four categories: process, machine, composition
of matter, and article of manufacture.62
Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an "Article of Manufac-
ture:" Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARXs-A.L J. CoMspur & INo. L. 89, 98
(1998). The same policy drives our patent system today. See id. at 98-99.
54 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
55 See id. § 103.
56 See id. § 101.
57 See id. § 112.
58 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
59 § 1, 1 Stat. at 110.
60 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch.11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836).
61 In 1952, following the Supreme Court's equation of "art" with "process," see, e.g.,
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) ("In the language of the patent law, [a pro-
cess] is an art."); Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1853) ("A process... is included
under the general term 'useful art.'"), Congress modified the statutory language to define
as patentable subject matter "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added), and defined the term "process" as any
"process, art or method," id. § 100(b). See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 797
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-101 (1994)); see also 1 CHiSUM, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-5 &
n.8 (discussing the evolution from "useful art" to "process").
62 See 35 U.S.C. § 101. "Statutory subject matter" is a term of art in patent law. In
order to be patentable, an invention must fall within the domain of statutory subject mat-
ter, which is limited to those categories enumerated in § 101 of the Patent Act. See I PETER
D. RoSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.00, at 6-3 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that
"[o]ne manner in which Congress may restrict the granting of patents is to limit that pro-
tection only to certain enumerated categories of invention, these specified categories of
patentable or statutory subject matter being less extensive, even collectively, than the realm
of inventive subject matter"). The term describes any invention that falls within the enu-
merated categories of § 101, while avoiding any judicial exceptions to § 101's categories.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). In addition, in order to constitute statu-
tory subject matter, the invention at issue must avoid any judicial exceptions to the catego-
ries prescribed by § 101. S~e infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text for descriptions of
judicial exceptions to the categories embraced by § 101. Courts should pursue the inquiry
into whether a patent claim falls within statutory subject matter wholly apart from the
Patent Act's other requirements for patentability. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-91; see also
20001 1127
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Over the last 200 years, Congress has broadened the scope of pat-
ent coverage. In fact, the expressed intent of Congress in passing the
1952 Patent Act was to "include [as patentable subject matter] any-
thing under the sun that is made by man."63 However, the Constitu-
tion limits the authority Congress may delegate to the Patent and
Trademark Office to provide patent protection for inventions. 64 In
light of this constitutional limitation, the Supreme Court has estab-
lished categories that define unpatentable subject matter. Tradition-
ally, the Court has excluded the following categories from patentable
subject matter: abstract ideas,65 natural phenomena, 66 and laws of na-
ture.67 These exceptions to patentability reflect the Court's belief that
ROSENBERG, supra, § 6.00, at 6-3 ("Statutory subject matter is a substantive criterion of pat-
entability separate and distinct from novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.").
63 S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R- REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
64 As Professor Chisum has noted, the Constitution provides separately for the promo-
tion of the progress of science and of the useful arts. See I CmsuM, supra note 23, § 1.01, at
1-5 n.9. Today, "useful arts" can be defined as "applied technology" and inventions in the
'useful arts" are eligible for patent protection. Id. at 1-5. Discoveries in pure science, how-
ever, can only be secured, if at all, by copyright protection, because the Constitution pro-
vides "Authors . . . the exclusive right to their... Writings" for the promotion of "the
Progress of Science." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Thus, Congress only has authority to
grant patent protection to useful applications of technology, not to the science behind the
technology. See I CmSUM, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-5 & n.9.
65 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874), introduced the con-
cept that abstract ideas do not merit patent protection. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that "[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made
practically useful is." Id. at 507. The claimed invention in Rubber-Tip Pencil was the attach-
ment of a small piece of rubber eraser to the blunt end of a pencil. See id. at 505. The
Court said in regards to this invention, "The idea of this patentee was a good one, but his
device to give it effect, though useful, was not new. Consequently he took nothing by his
patent." Id. at 507.
66 The natural phenomena exception arose out of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inocu-
lant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be inven-
tion from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new
and useful end."). In Funk Bros., the respondent attempted to enforce a patent covering a
mixture of different bacteria strains used to inoculate plants from the entire family of the
bacteria. See id. The Supreme Court held that the patentee did not actually invent any-
thing, but had simply discovered an existing phenomenon of nature. Thus, the patentee
did not deserve a patent for the discovery. See id. at 130-32.
67 O'eilly v. Morse 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), represents the genesis of the law of
nature exception to patentable subject matter.
The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature, with-
out any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a patent.
But he who takes this new element or power, as yet useless, from the labora-
tory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man; who applies it to
the perfecting of a new and useful art, or to the improvement of one al-
ready known, is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders its
protection.
Id. at 132-33 (Grier, J., concurring). Morse involved Samuel Morse's invention of the tele-
graph. In the patent's eighth claim, Morse rejected all limitations to the specific machin-
ery used to operate the telegraph, in effect claiming the entire concept of electronic
communications. See id. at 112-13. The Supreme Court invalidated the claim, explaining:
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the government should grant a patent monopoly only for inventions
that produce a useful physical manifestation, and not for simply inno-
vative ideas.68
As discussed earlier, in addition to these traditional exceptions,
the courts have crafted two other exceptions to statutory subject mat-
ter that affect software patents: the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion 69 and the business method exception."0 In the past, the
mathematical algorithm and business method exceptions provided
the highest hurdles to software developers seeking patent
protection.7'
When applying for patent protection, inventors have traditionally
characterized their software-related claims as processes.7 2 Concep-
"[Morse] claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not described
and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his
patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law." Id.
at 113.
68 See id. The Court expressed concern that allowing an inventor to claim an idea,
without requiring application of that idea to a specific physical manifestation, would pro-
duce two undesired results: First, the inventor would obtain a monopoly without providing
disclosure sufficient to allow others to improve upon the invention. See id. Second, the
inventor would be able to exercise a patent monopoly over any machine that used the
claimed principle, and not simply the inventor's embodiment of the invention. See id. The
Supreme Court's concern emanates from the Constitution's limitation of patent protection
to the "useful arts." See supra note 64.
69 The mathematical algorithm exception arose out of the Supreme Court's holding
in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a discussion of the evolution of the mathe-
matical algorithm exception, see Part I.B.
70 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d. Cir. 1908), provides the
genesis of the business method exception, although commentators have questioned the
exception's legitimacy. For a discussion of the exception and its shortcomings, see Part
I.C.
71 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
516 (D. Mass. 1996) (using the business method and mathematical algorithm exceptions to
invalidate a patent on a computer system designed to assist in the provision of financial
services), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
72 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-79, 191-93 (1981) (validating a patent
that claimed a process for computing rubber cure time based on actual temperature of the
rubber); Parker v. Hook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86, 594-95 (1978) (invalidating a patent that
claimed a process for updating alarm limits in catalytic converters).
A patent contains two components important to the § 101 subject matter analysis: the
claims and the specification. A patent's claims denote the invention over which the appli-
cant seeks a patent monopoly. As Professor Goldstein notes, "[l]ike a metes and bounds
description in a deed to real property, a patent's claim or claims establishes the boundary
of the property owner's exclusive rights." PAUL GoLDsTENm, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADE-
mARu AND RELATED STATE DocrNHEs: CAsES AND MATERuALs ON THE LAw OF INTELL cruAL
PROPERTY 384 (rev. 4th ed. 1999). The structure of a patent's claims reflects the particular
statutory categories relevant to the invention. Thus, a "process" claim corresponds to a
statutory process, while a "means-plus-function" claim is a way to claim a process as a
machine; the applicant claims a "means" for achieving each step in the invention's overall
function.
Conversely, in order to comply with the Patent Act's disclosure requirement, a pat-
ent's specification includes a detailed description of the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1994). The specification may limit the scope of the claims because, while patent appli-
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tually, this characterization makes sense: software is simply a set of
instructions that directs a machine (usually a computer) to perform a
series of steps to accomplish a desired result. However, for more cer-
tain patent protection, recent patent applicants have often character-
ized their software-related inventions as machines by employing the
"means-plus-function" style of claim drafting.73
The means-plus-function format characterizes the invention as a
machine, rather than a process. This characterization attempts to
avoid the pitfalls of the mathematical algorithm exception. But as the
Federal Circuit recently noted, "for the purposes of a § 101 [statutory
subject matter] analysis, it is of little relevance whether [a software
claim] is directed to a 'machine' or a 'process,' as long as it falls within
at least one of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject
matter."74
Similarly, in the last few years, patent applicants have begun to
claim their software-related inventions as articles of manufacture. For
example, the disputed claim in In re Beauregard5 describes the inven-
tion as "'a computer usable medium in which a program code is em-
bodied.'" 76 Like the means-plus-function format, the article of
manufacture format seeks to avoid the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion.77 However, State Street Bank suggests that such artful draftsman-
cants often phrase the claims in general terms, the specification contains specific details
about those terms. A court may substitute a specific implementation of the invention, as
described in the specification, for the general terms of the claim, limiting the scope of the
claim to that specific implementation. Thus, even though a claim may be impermissibly
broad when standing alone, a court may allow it if the specification limits the scope of the
claim. See In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (validating a patent based
on limitations in the specifications). For a discussion of the significance of Alappa see
infra Part I.B.3.
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("An element in a claim ... may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."); State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371-73 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing the means-plus-function elements of patent claims directed to "a data processing sys-
tem for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio"), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1093 (1999); In reFreeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1238-42 (C..P.A. 1978) (describing the means-
plus-claims function directed to a computer system for "typesetting alphanumeric informa-
tion"). For a detailed discussion of the ramifications of means-plus-function claims in
software patents, see Kass, supra note 49, passim
74 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372.
75 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
76 Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 120 (quoting PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences, Appeal No. 93-0378, at 1-2 (June 17, 1993)).
77 See id. at 119-20. Chiappetta notes:
[I]f the claimed implementation causes changes to the electronic structure
of the included computer readable medium, then the claim contains physi-
cal structure. If the claim contains physical structure, then it involves pat-
entable subject matter, either a machine or an article of manufacture,
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ship is now unnecessary28 Indeed, one of State Street Bank's progeny
has rendered the issue moot by holding that "[wihether stated implic-
itly or explicitly [in prior decisions], we consider the scope of § 101 to
be the same regardless of the form-machine or process-in which a
particular claim is drafted."79
B. The Mathematical Algorithm Exception
1. Supreme Court Foundations
The mathematical algorithm exception, the newest of the
Supreme Court's patentability exceptions,8 0 grew out of Gottschalk v.
Benson.8' In Benson, the Supreme Court applied to the field of digital
computers its earlier holdings that "[p]henomena of nature . . .
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patenta-
ble."8 2 The patent application in Benson involved a method of pro-
gramming a general-purpose digital computer that would convert
signals from binary-coded decimal format to pure binary form.8 3 No-
tably, the only physical limitation on the scope of the claim was the
"shift register," a generic piece of computer equipment, which imple-
mented the conversion process.8 4
As the first Supreme Court decision to examine software-related
inventions, Benson provided much of the rationale behind the subse-
quent body of mathematical algorithm case law.85 The Benson holding
indicated that without a physical limitation upon the patent claims, an
under § 101. There is, therefore, no need to apply the mathematical al-
gorithm... test.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the mathematical algorithm exception, see infra
Part I.B.
78 For a discussion of the potential impact of the State Street Bank decision on software
patents, see infra Part II.B.
79 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.)
(citing, inter alia, State Street Bank to support validation of claims in AT&T's patent that
were directed to a method for using a telecommunications system), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
368 (1999).
80 The other exceptions all arose in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
century. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
81 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The Supreme Court defined the term "algorithm" as "a proce-
dure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." Id. at 65.
82 Id. at 67.
83 See id. at 65-67.
84 Id. at 73; McDonald, supra note 3, 1 21. A patent applicant can include informa-
tion in the patent's specification to limit the scope of the claim. See supra note 72. By thus
narrowing the scope of the claim, the applicant can avoid a rejection based on an other-
wise impermissibly broad claim. The physical limitation would have narrowed the scope of
the claim to a particular physical implementation of the algorithm. Without such limita-
tion, a claim would conceivably preempt use of the algorithm itself, and not simply a partic-
ular application of the algorithm. Thus, by failing to narrow his claim beyond a
component found in every computer, Benson precluded use of his algorithm on any com-
puter. See McDonald, supra note 3, 11 21-24.
85 See McDonald, supra note 3, 11 21, 25.
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invention containing a mathematical algorithm is unpatentable per
se, as it otherwise would preempt all future use of the algorithm.86 In
the Court's view, because they did not effect any physical transforma-
tion, Benson's claims focused solely on the mathematical conver-
sion.87 Thus, validating this type of patent would foreclose all future
use of the algorithm at issue.88 Like the other exceptions to statutory
subject matter, the mathematical algorithm exception seeks to ensure
that the federal government does not preclude future inventors from
applying an abstract mathematical principle by granting a patent on
the principle itself.8 9 The Court implements the policy behind these
exceptions by restricting patentability to specific applications of the
principle. 90
The Supreme Court revisited the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion in Parker v. Flook 91 Rook's patent application involved a method
of updating alarm limits in a catalytic converter.92 Flook, the inven-
tor, attempted to distinguish Benson on the ground that the process in
Benson only involved mathematical algorithms, whereas the process in
Rook involved steps additional to the mere calculation of numerical
values.93 The Court, however, disagreed and held that a process is
nonstatutory94 if the mathematical algorithm is the only novel step.95
86 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72 ("The mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which
means that if [the patent at issue] is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the math-
ematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.").
87 See id. at 65.
88 See P Lewis Gable, An Historical Perspective on Patent Protection for Sofiware-Everything
Old Is New Again, in CoMPUTrr SorrwaRE PROTECTION, supra note 26, at 9, 21. As McDon-
ald notes, the Court's rationale for this rejection is questionable, because "[lthe subject
matter of a claim, rather than its scope, is the sole ambit of § 101 eligibility analysis." Mc-
Donald, supra note 3, 1 24 (citation omitted).
89 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
90 The Benson Court expanded the holdings of earlier "scientific principle" cases by
applying their "application" requirement to a process claim, as opposed to a product claim:
"[Earlier cases dealt with] 'product' claim[s], while the present case deals with a 'process'
claim. But we think the same principle applies. Here the 'process' claim is so abstract and
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [underlying scientific princi-
ple]." Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68.
91 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
92 See id. at 585-86.
93 See id. at 589-90.
94 That is, the process falls within the mathematical algorithm exception.
95 See Fook, 437 U.S. at 594-95. To properly analyze Fook, one must distinguish statu-
tory subject matter from the other requirements of the Patent Act. In addition to being
within one of the enumerated categories of § 101, an invention must also satisfy the novelty
requirement of § 102 and the nonobviousness requirement of § 103. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-
103 (1994). The Rook Court's "point of novelty" analysis commingles the requirements,
focusing not on the presence or absence of statutory subject matter, but on whether the
process meets the novelty and nonobviousness requirements without the algorithm at is-
sue. Thus, if the algorithm is the only step in the process distinguishable from the prior art
(the "point of novelty" in the invention), the claimed process fails the novelty inquiry and
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This "point of novelty" analysis has had a profound impact on software
patentability because the only novel aspects of most software-related
inventions are algorithms performing either new functions or existing
functions more efficiently.96
Flook also established the proposition that post-solution activity is
insufficient to render an otherwise nonstatutory algorithm patentable:
"The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a pat-
entable process exalts form over substance."97 Although the Court in-
validated Book's process, the Court nevertheless expressly restricted
its holding to the facts of the case and noted that "a process is not
unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathe-
matical algorithm."98
Although the Flook dictum preserved a foothold for mathematical
algorithms, the Court did not explicitly validate a process containing
an algorithm until Diamond v. Diehr.9 9 Diehrinvolved a process for cur-
ing rubber, which included an algorithm that continuously calculated
the remaining cure time for the rubber article.100 Because the "re-
spondents' claims involve[d] the transformation of an article,"'0 the
Supreme Court validated the patent, noting that the Court's "conclu-
sion regarding respondents' claims is not altered by the fact that in
several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a program-
med digital computer are used."'0 2
Diehr thus represents a withdrawal from the point of novelty ap-
proach of R/ook.' 0 3 With this retreat, the Court in Diehr returned to
the traditional definition of a statutory process: the "[t]ransformation
... of an article 'to a different state or thing.""u0 4 Furthermore, the
Court recognized the mathematical algorithm exception as a natural
is unpatentable even though some of the steps contained in the process might constitute
statutory subject matter. See F/ook, 437 U.S. at 595 n.18. In other words, "Rook... sug-
gested that an unpatentable principle of nature must be considered as though it were
known prior art, at least where it constituted an element of a claimed method or process."
1 CmsuM, supra note 23, § 1.03[2], at 1-69.
96 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
97 Fook, 437 U.S. at 590.
98 Id.
99 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
100 See id. at 177-78.
101 Id. at 184.
102 Id. at 185.
103 See id. at 189 n.12 (explaining that courts should apply the § 101 statutory subject
matter analysis to the entire claim, and notjust the algorithm.) The Court elaborated that
the argument that a process is nonstatutory if the algorithm constitutes the only novel
element in the process "would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once
known, make their implementation obvious." Id.
104 Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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corollary to the traditional framework of exceptions established in
O'Reilly v. Morse'05 and Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,10 6 rather than
as a new genre of exception. 10 7
The Court characterized the claims in Diehr much more favorably
than those in FRook, and this characterization shaped the Court's § 101
subject-matter inquiry. 08 Once the Court determined that Diehr's
use of the algorithm was part of a larger process, it deemed the pro-
cess patentable despite the centrality of the algorithm to the pro-
cess.109 In contrast, the Rook Court characterized the remaining
process as "post-solution" despite the fact that the algorithm's solution
served a specific purpose." 0 This characterization led to the conclu-
sion that the process was unpatentable."' Diehrthus retreats from the
Rook Court's nearly absolute prohibition against mathematical algo-
rithms. As long as the algorithms are part of a larger process, the
process itself may still be patentable.
The Diehrholding comports with traditional statutory subject mat-
ter exceptions. As long as an inventor claims an application of a scien-
tific principle or abstract idea, or, as in this case, an algorithm within a
process that contains other patentable steps, the claim recites statu-
tory subject matter. However, if the inventor attempts to claim an
idea or principle itself, or, as in this case, the algorithm without the
surrounding, limiting process, the claim is nonstatutory. 1" 2 Diehr was
the Supreme Court's last word on the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion, and Federal Circuit opinions have established the remainder of
the mathematical algorithm doctrine."13
105 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
106 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
107 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
108 Compare id. at 175 ("[The applicants'] process admittedly employs a well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather,
they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of
the other steps in their claimed process."), with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978)
("'[I]f a claim is directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical
formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatu-
tory.'" (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.G.P.A. 1977)).
109 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
110 Fook, 437 U.S. at 590.
"I1 See id. at 594-95.
112 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 ("Our earlier opinions lend support to our present con-
clusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatu-
tory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital
computer... [A] n application of a law of nature or mathematical formula... may well be
deserving of patent protection.").
113 See McDonald, supra note 3, 1 32.
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2. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinions in Gottschalk, Flook,
and Diehr, the CCPA, through a series of three decisions, developed a
two-part test to determine whether a claimed invention fell within the
mathematical algorithm exception.1 14 The first of these decisions, In
re Freeman,115 involved a process that used a computer to control a
phototypesetter. 116 In Freeman, the CCPA followed a two-step process
to determine if the mathematical algorithm exception prevented pat-
ent protection for the claimed invention. In the first step, the court
sought to determine "whether the claim directly or indirectly recites
an 'algorithm' in the Benson sense of that term," because only such a
claim could preempt an algorithm. 117 If the claim did contain a Ben-
son algorithm, the second step of the test required the court to deter-
mine "whether in its entirety [the claim] wholly preempts that
algorithm."" 18 However, the Freeman court did not address the second
stage of this inquiry because it held that the claim did not recite a
Benson algorithm." 9
In re Walter120 involved a method of seismic prospecting and sur-
veying, which estimated subsurface formations by using a mathemati-
cal algorithm to "cross-correlate" emitted vibration waves that
subsequently returned through the earth.' 2 ' The CCPA emphasized
that a court should consider the relationship between the algorithm
and the remaining substance of the claim when deciding whether a
process containing a mathematical algorithm constitutes statutory sub-
ject matter. 22 To that end, the CCPA revised the second step of its
mathematical algorithm exception analysis:
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a
whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical
114 See generally Gable, supra note 88, at 30-44 (reviewing the development and decline
of the Freeman-Walter-Abele two-step test).
115 573 F.2d 1237 (C.G.P.A. 1978).
116 See id. at 1238.
117 Id. at 1245. Note the specific reference to a "Benson" algorithm. The CCPA distin-
guished the Benson algorithm from the generic definition of algorithm. Compare id. ("[A]s
in Benson, they recite a 'procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem.'"
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972))), with In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152,
156 n.5 (The broader definition algorithm is "'a step-by-step procedure for solving a prob-
lem or accomplishing some end.'" (quoting WEBSrER's NEW COLLEGIATE DIcNoNARY
(1976))). As the Freeman court noted, "[b]ecause every process may be characterized as 'a
step-by-step procedure... for accomplishing some end,' a refusal to recognize that Benson
was concerned only with mathematical algorithms leads to the absurd view that the Court
was reading the word 'process' out of [35 U.S.C. § 101]." In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1246.
118 In reFreeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
119 See id.
120 618 F.2d 758 (C.G.P.A. 1980).
121 Id. at 760-61.
122 See id. at 765.
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algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural
relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in appara-
tus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under
§ 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented
and solved by the claimed invention... and is not applied in any
manner to physical elements or process steps, no amount of post-
solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor is it saved by a
preamble merely reciting the field of use of the mathematical
algorithm. 123
Thus, Walter narrowed the scope of the second step of the inquiry by
examining not simply whether the claim completely preempted the
algorithm, but rather whether the algorithm is actually interrelated
with the physical elements of the claim. 12 4
In addition to establishing the two-stage mathematical algorithm
exception inquiry, Freeman and Walter signaled a retreat from the
point of novelty inquiry of /ook.125 The CCPA emphatically con-
demned the point of novelty approach in Walter
If [the point of novelty] approach were to be adopted it would
immeasurably debilitate the patent system. We do not believe the
Supreme Court has acted in a manner so potentially destructive. As
an illustration of the utter failure of such an approach to resolve
these questions, we offer the example of certain improvement in-
ventions, wherein the improvement resides in the application of sci-
entific truth, e.g., mathematical formulae, to previously-known
structure or process steps.
Improvement inventions are expressly included within § 101
.... Yet a strict "point of novelty" approach to improvement inven-
tions involving the application of scientific truth as the improve-
ment would effectively place them, as a class, outside the coverage
of § 101-and to no purpose. 126
The Supreme Court embraced the CCPA's rejection of the point
of novelty approach in Diehr.12 7 The Court's rejection of this ap-
123 Id. at 767 (footnote omitted).
124 See Gable, supra note 88, at 31-32.
125 See In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 766; In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
("We have indicated the inappropriateness of the 'point of novelty' approach in determin-
ing whether a claimed invention is statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."). For a
discussion of Rook's "point of novelty" analysis, see supra note 95.
126 In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 766.
127 See Gable, supra note 88, at 28; Lance L. Vietzke, Patent Protection for Computerized
Business Methods, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1995, at 6, 7 ("The Court in Diehr effectively over-
ruled the point of novelty approach of Rook and reaffirmed one of the basic premises in
Benson."). Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S 175, 188-89 (1981) ("The 'novelty' of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determin-
ing whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly pat-
entable subject matter."), with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) ("Respondent's
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proach reaffirmed the conceptual distinction between the subject
matter requirement of § 101 and the novelty requirement of § 102.128
This distinction paved the way for later CCPA and Federal Circuit de-
cisions that more closely analyzed the relationship between mathemat-
ical algorithms and the particularized claims at issue.129
In re Abele' 30 established the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in its final
form. Abele sought to patent an improvement in the field of comput-
erized tomography, commonly known as a CAT scan. 31 The improve-
ment involved a new method of interpreting the data received from
the scanning apparatus that required fewer scans to obtain a clear im-
age. Claims 5 and 6 of the patent application read:
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps
of
calculating the difference between the local value of the data at a
data point in the field and the average value of the data in a region
of the field which surrounds said point for each point in said field,
and
displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray scale at a
point in a picture which corresponds to said data point.
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray attenuation
data produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomogra-
phy scanner.132
The CCPA concluded that the claims constituted a mathematical al-
gorithm under the first step of the test, relying on the "calculating the
difference" language of claim 5.133
process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as
one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art
[and thus not novel], the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.").
128 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189-91.
129 See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
130 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.PA 1982).
131 The court explained in detail the mechanism of computed tomography:
Basically, computed tomography provides an image representing a
transverse slice of the body. This slicing is accomplished by rotating an X-
ray source and a detection means around the perimeter of the section to be
viewed. The source and detection means are placed 180* from each other
to allow the detection means to measure the attenuation of the beam as it
passes through the plane of interest. When enough measurements have
been taken, a computer is implemented to mathematically interpret the
data, which is then displayed as a reconstruction of the slice on, inter alia, a
television screen for diagnostic purposes.
Id. at 903.
132 Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
133 See id. at 907.
20001 1137
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Instead of requiring that the mathematical algorithm define the
structural relationship between the physical elements of the claim,' 3 4
the CCPA panel expanded the scope of the second step by requiring
only that the claims applied the algorithm in any manner to physical
elements or process steps.' 35 Moreover, if the claims with the mathe-
matical algorithms subtracted recite statutory subject matter, the
claims fall within statutory subject matter when incorporating the al-
gorithm.'3 6 This remains true even if the claims are inoperative with-
out the algorithms.
When applying the revised test to claim 6, the CCPA found that
the mathematical algorithm pertained to the physical elements of the
claim, namely the X-ray data. 3 7 Conversely, the CCPA held that claim
5, which did not refer to any specific data to which the mathematical
algorithm might apply, was "directed solely to the mathematical al-
gorithm portion of appellants' invention and is, thus, not statutory
subject matter under § 101."138
Viewed cumulatively, Freeman, Walter, and Abele established a two-
stage test to determine whether a claim containing an algorithm falls
within statutory subject matter. The first step inquires whether the
algorithm is in fact a mathematical algorithm as defined by Benson.'39
If the claim includes a Benson algorithm, the second step of the test
requires the court to determine whether the algorithm applies only to
some physical elements of the claim or the patent instead claims solely
the algorithm itself.' 40 Both stages of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test have
proven problematic, 141 and the Federal Circuit subsequently re-
vamped its mathematical algorithm exception inquiry through a series
of cases in 1994.
134 The inquiry in Walter focused on whether the mathematical algorithm actually in-
terrelated with the structure of the physical elements of the claim. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 123-24.
L35 See In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 906; Gable, supra note 88, at 35-36.
136 See In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 907 ("[If the claim would be 'otherwise statutory,' albeit
inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory sub-
ject matter when the algorithm is included." (citation omitted)).
137 See id. at 908.
138 Id.
139 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
140 See Vietzke, supra note 127, at 7.
141 See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1062-64
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (arguing that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test ignores
Supreme Court precedent established in Benson, Hook, and Diehr and criticizing the test's
dependence on a definition of "'mathematical algorithm'" that "remain[s] vague" and is
"'w]ithout a statutory anchor"); see also Gable, supra note 88, at 39-43 (analyzing In re
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and detailing the Federal Circuit's "struggle[ ] with
each of [Freeman-Walter-Abele's] two steps" in that case); Vietzke, supra note 127, at 7-8
(describing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as "cumbersome and sometimes unworkable").
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3. The 1994 Cases
Through a series of decisions in 1994, the Federal Circuit re-
jected the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in favor of a more workable ap-
proach. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp. 1 4 2
foreshadowed the demise of the old two-stage test, when it recognized
that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was not the only method available to
determine whether a mathematical algorithm renders a claim inva-
lid.143 Moreover, a concurring opinion in Arrhythmia Research strongly
criticized the two-step test in favor of a more certain approach. 44
In re Schrader445 represents the Federal Circuit's last foray into the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test.' 46 Schrader illustrates many of the difficulties
inherent to that test.147 In Schrader, the Federal Circuit invalidated the
applicant's attempt to patent a method of calculating competitive bids
on a series of related items.148 The claimed invention determined the
winning bid by calculating whether a single bid on all of the items or
the aggregate of multiple bids on the individual bids totaled a greater
sum.149 Because the disputed claim recited no physical limitation, the
court concluded that it failed the second step of the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test.150 Although Schrader seemingly stretched the definition of
mathematical algorithm beyond the bounds of logic, 151 the case is
142 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
143 See id. at 1058 ("[T]he Freeman-Walter-Abele analysis is not the only test for statutory
subject matter, and this court has stated that failure to meet that test may not always defeat
the claim .... " (citations omitted)).
144 See id. at 1066 (Rader, J., concurring) ("The Supreme Court has focused this
court's inquiry on the statute, not on special rules for computer art or mathematical art or
any other art. ... [T]he Supreme Court's most recent message is clear when all else fails
(and the [Freeman-Walter-Abele] algorithm rule clearly has), consult the statute.").
14 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
146 See Gable, supra note 88, at 39 (arguing that Schrader "[p]ushes the [a]lgorithm
[fhocused Freeman-Walter-Abele [tiest [t]oo [far!").
147 See id.
148 See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 291.
149 See id. at 291-92.
150 See id. at 293-94 (" [T] here is nothing physical about bids per se. Thus, the grouping
or regrouping of bids cannot constitute a physical change, effect, or result.")
151 In attempting to reconcile its overly broad conception of when a mathematical
algorithm should preclude patentability with the Supreme Court's limited expression of
the mathematical algorithm exception in Diehr, the Schrader majority argued:
There is no inconsistency between [the holding in Schrader] and the state-
ment in Diehr that the mathematical algorithm exception is limited to those
algorithms that express a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an ab-
stract idea. Schrader's algorithm relates to two obvious and familiar modes
of human behavior that potential buyers naturally may submit bids on one,
some, or all of the items available for sale, and that sellers may naturally
choose that combination of bids that maximize their profits.
Id. at 293 n.8 (citation omitted). The Schrader court's conception of an auction as a math-
ematical algorithm strains the Supreme Court's construction of that term in Diehr.
Although Schrader's invention may have lacked utility or novelty, it is difficult to argue that
it recites an abstract mathematical algorithm. See Gable, supra note 88, at 3940.
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most notable forJudge Newman's dissent.152 Her dissenting opinion
laid groundwork for the Federal Circuit's eventual abandonment of
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and set the stage for a new standard. 153
In the landmark en banc decision, In re Alappat,15 4 the Federal
Court implicitly deserted the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in favor of a re-
turn to the statutory language of § 101 and its Supreme Court inter-
pretations.155 Alappat invented a "a rasterizer for creating a smooth
waveform" on an oscilloscope. 156 The PTO Board of Appeals rejected
the patent application, "because it '[merely] reads on a general pur-
pose digital computer "means" to perform the various steps under
program control."' 57 The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed. The
court held that the inclusion of a "programmed general purpose com-
puter" as an element in the claims
[did] not justify holding [the claims] unpatentable as directed to
nonstatutory subject matter.... [S]uch programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a
special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform partic-
ular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.' 58
The Alappat court rejected the prior notion of the mathematical
algorithm as "an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter ex-
cluded from § 101.'1 59 The Federal Circuit instead read Benson, Flook,
and Diehr as "an attempt by the Court to explain a rather straightfor-
ward concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical subject mat-
ter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until
reduced to some type of practical application.' 60 Thus, Alappat estab-
lished a new standard for mathematical algorithms; Alappats subject
152 See, e.g., Gable, supra note 88, at 43 (discussing Judge Newman's dissent in
Schrader).
153 Compare In re Schrade,; 22 F.3d at 297 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The test [for statu-
tory subject matter] is simply whether the mathematical formula or equation is all that is
claimed, or whether the procedures involving the specified mathematics are part of a use-
ful process. When the latter requirement is met the subject matter is statutory."), with In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating that "the proper inquiry in
dealing with the so called mathematical subject matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is
to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical con-
cept... [or] a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result" and
that the specific machine would be patentable, but the disembodied mathematical concept
would not).
154 33 F.Sd 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
155 See id. at 1542-44; see also Gable, supra note 88, at 44 ("Without mentioning the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test by name, the Federal Circuit stated that § 101 determinations must
be made in accordance with the primary authorities, that is, the statutory language of§ 101
and the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions Benson, Flook and Diehr" (footnotes omitted)).
156 In re Alappat 33 F.3d at 1544.
157 Id. at 154445 (quoting the PTO Board's opinion).
158 Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 1543.
160 Id.
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matter inquiry focused on whether the claim recites a practical appli-
cation of the algorithm or only covers the algorithm itself. This new
standard fit neatly within the framework of traditional judicial excep-
tions.161 More importantly to software developers, it "placed a Federal
Circuit imprimatur on the proposition that ... claims embodying
mathematical algorithms are statutory," where physical apparatus lim-
its the scope of the claim to a practical application of the algorithm. 162
The court also reemphasized that a proper § 101 inquiry should ana-
lyze the claim as a whole, not just pieces thereof:
It is thus not necessary to determine whether a claim contains, as
merely a part of the whole, any mathematical subject matter which
standing alone would not be entitled to patent protection. Indeed,
because the dispositive inquiry is whether the claim as a whole is di-
rected to statutory subject matter, it is irrelevant that a claim may
contain, as part of the whole, subject matter which would not be
patentable by itself.' 63
While resolving many issues in the software patent controversy,
Alappat perpetuated one unfortunate artifact of the mathematical al-
gorithm exception: it continued to place dispositive weight on the pat-
ent's claim format. In Alappat, the Federal Circuit relied heavily upon
the fact that the applicant drafted his claim in means-plus-function
format.a64 After Alappat, a software developer could therefore reason-
ably ensure grant of a patent by limiting the scope of the patent claims
to a practical application of a mathematical algorithm and by drafting
the claims in means-plus-function format. The Alappat majority did
leave open the question of how drafting claims in other formats would
affect patentability, thereby muddying the waters yet again for future
software patent applicants. 165 Although the Federal Circuit decided
161 Cf. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132-33 (1853) (commenting that,
although "[t]he mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature, without
any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a patent," an application of
such is patentable subject matter).
162 Bender, supra note 26, at 169.
163 In re Alappa4 33 F.3d at 1543. The Alappat court also noted:
[A]n analysis wherein one attempts to identify whether any part of a claim
recites mathematical subject matter which would not by itself be patentable
is not an improper analysis. Such a dissection of a claim may be helpful
under some circumstances to more fully understand the claimed subject
matter. Nevertheless, even in those cases wherein courts have applied a
variant of the two-part analysis of In re Freeman, as amended by In re Walter,
the ultimate issue always has been whether the claim as a whole is drawn to
statutory subject matter.
Id. at 1543 n.21 (citations omitted).
164 See Gable, supra note 88, at 52-53.
165 Alappat and its progeny ignited a new scholarly debate: a dispute over the best
method of claiming software inventions. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 114 (postu-
lating that "[the Alappat court's] willing abandonment of the [Freeman-Walter-Abele] /mathe-
matical algorithm analysis in [means-plus-function claims] set the tone and direction for its
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several mathematical algorithm cases subsequent to Alappat,166 its
mathematical algorithm jurisprudence remained virtually unchanged
until State Street Bank.
C. The Business Method Exception
Like the mathematical algorithm exception, the business method
exception has thwarted the efforts of many software patent appli-
cants.167 However, the judicial foundations of the business method
exception are far murkier than those of its mathematical algorithm
counterpart. 68 According to the district court judge in State Street
Bank, "[a] s established by a series of older cases, business methods are
unpatentable abstract ideas."' 69 Some commentators, however, be-
lieved that the business method exception's analytic value is "dubi-
ous.
1 7 0 Moreover, "no [appellate] court majority has ever held that
[an otherwise patentable invention] was per se unpatentable simply be-
cause the method was directed to a way to conduct business."' 71
Although earlier cases alluded to a prohibition against patents
claiming methods of doing business, most scholars consider the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.' 72 as
the "genesis of the business method exception." 17 The invention in
that case was a "'method of and means for cash-registering and ac-
count-checking,"' intended to prevent hotel and restaurant personnel
approach [in later cases] to [another] hardware-software combination claim format
software as article of manufacture"); Kass, supra note 49, at 866 (noting "[the Federal
Circuit's willingness to engage in limited legal fiction in order to find computer-related
inventions patentable" and arguing that "the current relaxed standard is limited to claims
drafted in means-plus-function format").
166 See, e.g., In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1994), withdrawn, 60 F.3d 807
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
167 See Vietzke, supra note 127, at 8 (observing that the business method exception "has
remained a significant and difficult obstacle within the PTO to some software-related
inventions").
168 See id. ("In comparison to the mathematical algorithm exception, the business
method exception is much less well defined.").
169 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D.
Mass. 1996), reuld, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
170 Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a
Statutoy Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 404 (1998).
171 Id. at 403.
172 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
173 Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 405.
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from committing fraud. 174 In an oft-cited 175 passage, the Second Cir-
cuit found that "[a] system of transacting business disconnected from
the means for carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal
interpretation of the term, [patentable material] ."176 Thus, the busi-
ness method exception was born.
Scholars have criticized the business method exception for a vari-
ety of reasons. 17 7 First, courts have never properly defined the term
"business method."178 Furthermore, the analytic value of the excep-
tion is suspect. One scholar has commented: "Nearly every case that
supposedly invoked this rule simply restated the longstanding proposi-
tion that naked ideas, bereft of anything physically inventive, are not
patentable. At best, these allusions to business were unnecessary. At
worst, they caused confusion."1 7
9
Moreover, the business method exception was merely dictum in
the decision that purportedly created the exception. 180 AsJudge New-
man noted in her Schrader dissenting opinion, "the [Hotel Security
174 Hotel Sec. Checking; 160 F. at 467. One commentator described the invention in
Hotel Security Checking
Reduced by all of the unnecessary embellishments, the invention worked as
follows: a head waiter was to assign every waiter a number; the waiters were
to be equipped with slips with their numbers on them; on a separate piece
of paper, the head waiter maintained records of the food each waiter was
taking from the kitchen; when the waiter or customer paid for the meal, the
head cashier took the slip; so by comparing the food taken from kitchen to
the amount paid, indicated by the returned slips, it could be ascertained if
a waiter was pocketing the cost of the meal as well as his tip.
Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 406.
175 See, e.g., PATENT AND TRADEsmsAK OFFI E, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PAT-
ENT ExNuNrNG PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (5th ed. 1993) (citing Hotel Security Checking as au-
thority for the business method exception). The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) is the official manual for patent examiners in the PTO. Notably, the PTO re-
moved the citation to Hotel Security Checking from the latest version of the MPEP. See Del
Gallo, supra note 170, at 404.
176 Hotel Sec. Checking, 160 F. at 469.
177 See, e.g., Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 404 ("[T]he business method exception is of
dubious analytic value."); id. at 411 (noting that several commentators, chief among them
Federal Circuit Judge Newman, have given the business method exception "Icy Recep-
tions"); Vietzke, supra note 127, at 6 ("The business method exception should be elimi-
nated. It is redundant and even less well defined than the mathematical algorithm
exception. Moreover, it is an unnecessary obstacle to patent protection for computer-im-
plemented inventions.").
178 See Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 411 (citingJudge Newman for the proposition that
the business method exception is "'fuzzy'" (quoting In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting))); Vietzke, supra note 127, at 9 ("[T]here is no clear
definition of the terms 'method of doing business' or 'business method.' Accordingly,
many claims which clearly define patentable subject matter could arguably also involve a
business method.").
179 Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 404.
180 See id. at 406-07 ("[In Hotel Security Checking], the patent was struck for lack of nov-
elty and invention, not because it was improper subject matter for a patent... [T]he lack
of an inventive physical nexus, not the presence of a business method, was the chief concern of
the court.").
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Checking] court discussed the 'obviousness' of the system of records
kept to prevent embezzlement by waiters at considerably greater
length than whether the subject matter was 'statutory.""181
Finally, the exception is itself an exercise in meaningless com-
plexity. Judge Newman commented: "[T]he jurisprudence does not
require the creation of a distinct business class of unpatentable sub-
ject matter. [Hotel Security Checking and its progeny] simply reaffirm
that the patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures,
not mere ideas."8 2 In other words, courts could almost universally
have invalidated any patent claiming an unpatentable business
method on grounds other than the business method exception. 83
Nonetheless, the PTO incorporated the business method exception
into its lexicon and has, until recently, used it to challenge numerous
patent applications.' 8 4
181 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting).
182 Id. 4citation omitted).
183 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The business method exception has never been invoked by this court, or
the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable. Application of this particular exception
has always been preceded by a ruling based on some clearer concept of [the Patent Act]
or, more commonly, application of the [mathematical algorithm] exception.. . ."), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). A patent attorney described the confusion created by the
Hotel Security Checking decision as follows:
While the seemingly clear import of the [Hotel Security Checking hold-
ing] was that an invention of a process had to be directed to a physical
means, the [case] would be, for nearly a century, enshrined as holding that
all business systems were per se unpatentable.
This pattern would persist Courts would declare that there must be a
physical nexus by the employment of an inventive physical means. These
cases would then be fallaciously recited for the principle that business
methods are not patentable. As time passed, these misinterpreted cases
were queued up by authors to lend support to the myth that business sys-
tems or methods are per se improper subject matter for patents. A phantas-
mic body of law had been created.
Del Gallo, supra note 170, at 408. But see In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942)
("[A] system of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such system, is
not within the purview of [the Patent Act] .... "). Although Patton seems to suggest that
business methods are per se unpatentable, one can also read the passage as simply requir-
ing that a patent claim an implementation of a method, and not simply the abstract
method. Such a reading supports Del Gallo's hypothesis and comports with the Supreme
Court's statutory subject matter framework, as discussed supra Part IA. Cf Del Gallo, supra
note 170, at 415 ("Where the physical means for carrying out a business method have been
novel and inventive, patents have been upheld as within the purview of subject matter
eligibility.").
184 Until recently, the official patent examiners' manual contained a reference to the
business method exception. See supra note 175; see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 297-98
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("The [PTO] Board [of Appeals] . . . relied on the 'method of
doing business' ground for finding Schrader's subject matter non-statutory under section
101."); In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869, 870 (C.C.P.A. 1968) ("The [PTO] Board of Appeals
affirmed the [patent examiner's] rejection... 'since the claims are drawn to a method of
doing business.'" (quoting the opinion of the PTO Board)); In rePatton, 127 F.2d at 327-28
(affirming under the business method exception the PTO Board's rejection of a patent
covering a fire-fighting apparatus for use during air attacks).
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The business method exception poses a high hurdle for software
developers, because many software applications simply automate
methods of doing business. For instance, the popular personal fi-
nance software package Quicken® basically automates the process of
writing and recording checks. If any part of this application is novel
and useful, it should normally qualify for patent protection. Since the
application is primarily a method of doing business, however, one
could argue that the entire invention is nonstatutory under the busi-
ness method exception.
Recognizing this dilemma, Judge Newman in her Schrader dissent
sought to put the business method exception to rest:
Indeed [the business method exception] is fuzzy; and since it is also
an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject
matter in section 101, my guidance is that it be discarded as error-
prone, redundant, and obsolete. It merits retirement from the glos-
sary of section 101.
I discern no purpose in perpetuating a poorly defined, redun-
dant, and unnecessary "business methods" exception, indeed en-
larging (and enhancing the fuzziness of) that exception by applying
it in this case. 185
Unfortunately, until its decision in State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit
declined to followJudge Newman's advice; instead, it allowed the un-
certainty generated by the business method exception to continue to
confound judges and scholars alike.' 8 6
II
STATE STET BANAc A WATERSHED
In the spring of 1996, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
dal Group, Inc.,187 a suit between two mutual fund management corpo-
185 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
186 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
515 (D. Mass. 1996) ("As established by a series of older cases, business methods are unpat-
entable abstract ideas [citing Hotel Security Checking and its progeny]. Recent [Federal Cir-
cuit] decisions, while not holding explicitly on these grounds, recognize the continued
validity of that rule [citing Alappat and others]."), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); 1 CHISUM, supra note 23, § 1.03[5], at 1-75 ("[B]usiness
'plans' and 'systems' are not patentable, even though they may not be dependent upon the
aesthetic, emotional, or judgmental reactions of a human."); 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 62,
§ 6.02[3] [b], at 6-85 ("Whereas an apparatus or system capable of performing a business
function constitutes statutory subject matter, the law remains that a method of doing busi-
ness, whether or not generated by an apparatus or system, does not constitute statutory
subject matter.").
187 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. C. 851 (1999).
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rations. The suit was a declaratory action in which State Street Bank &
Trust ("State Street Bank") sought to invalidate U.S. Patent No.
5,193,056 (the "'056 Patent"), 188 assigned to Signature Financial
Group ("Signature"). 189 The '056 Patent covered a "'data processing
system"' for administering a "'Hub and Spoke"' configuration of mu-
tual funds. 190 The patent consisted of six claims, all using the means-
plus-function format, only the first of which was an independent
claim. 191 Basically, the Hub and Spoke configuration involves an in-
188 For a discussion of the '056 Patent's specification and claim, see infra notes 190-91
and accompanying text.
189 See State St. Bank, 927 F. Supp. at 504.
190 Id. at 504 (quoting '056 Patent). The patent's specification described the invention
as following
The present invention provides a data processing system and method
for monitoring and recording the information flow and data, and making
all calculations, necessary for maintaining a partnership portfolio and part-
ner fund (Hub and Spoke) financial services configuration. In particular,
the data processing system provides means for a daily allocation of assets of
two or more funds (Spokes) that are invested in a portfolio (Hub). The
data processing system determines the percentage share (allocation ratio)
that each fund has in the portfolio, while taking into consideration daily
changes both in the value of the portfolio's investment securities (as deter-
mined by market prices) and in the amount of each fund's assets (as deter-
mined by daily shareholder purchases and redemptions). The system also
allocates to each fund the portfolio's daily income, expenses, and net real-
ized and unrealized gain or loss, calculating each fund's total investments
based on the concept of a book capital account, thus enabling determina-
tion of a true asset value of each fund and accurate calculation of allocation
ratios between the funds. The data processing system also tracks all the
relevant data, determined on a daily basis for the portfolio and each fund,
so that aggregate year-end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss can be
determined for accounting and for tax purposes for the portfolio and for
each fund.
U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 to Boes, col. 4, issued Mar. 9, 1993 (Data Processing System for
Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration) [hereinafter '056 Patent].
191 See State St. Bank, 927 F. Supp. at 505. The lone independent claim of the '056
Patent recited the following-
A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of
a portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plural-
ity of funds, comprising:
(a) computer processor means for processing data;
(b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium;
(c) first means for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and
each of the funds from a previous day and data regarding increases or de-
creases in each of the funds, assets and for allocating the percentage share that
each fund holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, ex-
penses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such
data among each fund;
(f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or
loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, ex-
penses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.
'056 Patent, supra note 190, col. 13.
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vestment structure in which mutual funds ("Spokes") pool their assets
in an investment portfolio ("Hub"), organized as a partnership.192 Be-
cause of the unique administrative challenges inherent to the com-
plex financial structure, Signature created a computer program to
manage the financial calculations required for the daily maintenance
of the fund and to store the resulting information for accounting
purposes. 193
State Street Bank's declaratory action arose out of failed licensing
negotiations between the parties. 194 State Street Bank served as custo-
dian for several multi-tiered mutual funds of a form similar to those
described in the '056 Patent' 95 and attempted to acquire a license for
the software from Signature. When the negotiations broke down, pre-
sumably in an effort to preempt an infringement suit by Signature,
State Street Bank sought declaratory judgment on four counts: nonin-
fringement, patent misuse, patent invalidity, and unenforceability due
to inequitable conduct 196 Signature counterclaimed, alleging unfair
and deceptive trade practices under Massachusetts state law and seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that State Street Bank had entered into a
valid and binding licensing agreement for the '056 patent. 9 7
In ruling on State Street Bank's motion for partial sunmaryjudg-
ment, the district court held that the patent for the claimed invention
was invalid because it fell within both the mathematical algorithm and
business method exceptions. 198 The court then dismissed both of Sig-
nature's counterclaims. 199 Signature subsequently appealed the dis-
trict court's decision to the Federal Circuit.200
A. A New Look at Old Requirements
On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the substantive
issue-whether the patent claimed statutory subject matter-was a
192 See State St. Bank, 927 F. Supp. at 504.
193 See id. at 505.
194 See id. at 506.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 504 n.1. Noninfringement invalidity, and patent misuse are all affirmative
defenses to a patentee's allegations of infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) ("The
following shall be defenses in any action involving the... infringement of a patent and
shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement.... (2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit
.... "); 6 CHISUM, supra note 23, § 19.01, at 19-5 ("The third major defense [to an infringe-
ment action] is [patent] misuse .... If a patent owner exploits his patent in an improper
manner by violating the antitrust laws or extending the patent beyond its lawful scope, the
courts will withhold any remedy for infringement...
197 See State St. Bank, 927 F. Supp. at 504 n.1, 516.
198 See id. at 514-16.
199 See id at 517.
200 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
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matter of both claim construction and statutory construction. 201 The
court then held that de novo review was proper for both allegedly fact-
based questions relating to claim construction and issues related to
statutory construction.20 2 In reversing the district court, the Federal
Circuit held that the '056 Patent's claims "are directed to statutory
subject matter."20 3
The Federal Circuit began its discussion by criticizing the district
court's characterization of the patent's machine (means-plus-func-
tion) claims as processes: "'[M]achine' claims having 'means' clauses
may only be reasonably viewed as process claims if there is no support-
ing structure in the written [specification] that corresponds to the
claimed 'means' elements."20 4 For instance, although claim 1 refers
only to a "computer processor means," 20 5 the specification disclosed
"a personal computer,"20 6 and the Federal Circuit viewed the claim as
limited to the disclosed physical structure. 20 7 More importantly, the
court noted:
[F]or the purposes of a § 101 [subject matter] analysis, it is of little
relevance whether [a patent claim] is directed to a "machine" or a
"process," as long as it falls within at least one of the four enumer-
ated categories of patentable subject matter, "machine" and "pro-
cess" being such categories.208
This statement contrasts sharply with the prior confusion regarding
the importance of claim format in patentability determinations and
may significantly simplify the § 101 analysis in future cases. 209
The Federal Circuit then addressed the district court's holding
that Signature's patent fell within the mathematical algorithm and
business method exceptions to statutory subject matter. The panel
was clearly hostile to going beyond the three traditional exceptions. 210
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1371. For an explanation of the importance of including physical limitations
in the patent's specification, see supra note 84.
205 '056 Patent, supra note 190, col. 13.
206 Id. col. 7.
207 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1371-72.
208 Id. at 1372.
209 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the central role
that claim format formerly had on patentability. The court went on to note that "although
we do not make this determination here, the judicially created exceptions, i.e., abstract
ideas, laws of nature, etc., should be applicable to all categories of statutory subject matter
... " State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372 n.1.
210 The three traditional exceptions to statutory subject matter are "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
The Supreme Court established these three exceptions long before the advent of com-
puters. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (natu-
ral phenomena); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)
(abstract ideas); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1853) (laws of nature).
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Before examining the disputed exceptions individually, the court
noted:
The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention
falling within one of the four stated categories of statutory subject
matter [i.e., process, machine, article of manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter] may be patented, provided it meets the other re-
quirements for patentability set forth in [the Patent Act], i.e., those
found in §§ 102, 103, and 112 [novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and
adequacy of disclosure, respectively].
The repetitive use of the expansive term "any" in § 101 shows
Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter
for which a patent may be obtained beyond those specifically re-
cited in § 101 .... Congress intended § 101 to extend to "anything
under the sun that is made by man." Thus, it is improper to read
limitations into § 101 on the subject matter that may be patented
where the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did not
intend such limitations. 211
Thus, the court reiterated the rationale behind its holding in Alappat
that "it is improper to read into § 101 limitations as to the subject
matter that may be patented where the legislative history does not in-
dicate that Congress clearly intended such limitations."2 12 Having es-
tablished the background principles for § 101 inquiries, the court
proceeded to deal individually with each exception.
The court first examined the mathematical algorithm exception.
It rejected the district court's use of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and
noted that, even if the two-step test adequately determines whether
the claim contained a mathematical algorithm, "after Diehr and Alap-
pat, the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting num-
bers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers,
in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, un-
less, of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and
tangible result.' 2 13 Furthermore, the court noted:
The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject
matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject
matter a claim is directed to-process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter-but rather on the essential characteristics
of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility. Section 101
specifies that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other
"conditions and requirements" of [the Patent Act], including nov-
elty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice.2 14
211 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372-73 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980) (footnotes and citations omitted)).
212 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
213 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
214 Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted).
2000] 1149
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Taken together, these two statements imply that the Federal Circuit
has abandoned the old notion of the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion and replaced it with the statutory characteristics required of all
patentable inventions. First, the invention must fall into one of the
four enumerated categories of statutory patentable subject matter.
Second, the invention must be novel, useful, and nonobvious.
In determining whether Signature's invention deserved patent
protection, the court did not even consider whether an algorithm was
present in the claimed invention. The court replaced the former judi-
cial requirement that a claim embodying an algorithm effect a physi-
cal transformation with the statutory requirements of novelty and
utility.2 1 5 This new approach is logically appealing: If a software-re-
lated invention is new and useful, it is necessarily an application of an
algorithm. An algorithm in the abstract can never have utility; only a
specific application of an algorithm has sufficient utility to garner pat-
ent protection.21 6 The new inquiry follows the original rationale of
the mathematical algorithm exception, recognizing that a patent
should not preempt all future uses of the algorithm.2 17 The new in-
quiry, however, allows a developer to secure protection for a software
invention that employs a mathematical algorithm to achieve a new
and useful result.2 18
The parallel between mathematical algorithms and abstract ideas
further supports the court's holding in State Street Bank While abstract
ideas are themselves ineligible for patent protection, useful applica-
tions of those ideas are patentable.2 1 9 Similarly, while one may not
patent an algorithm standing alone, a new and useful application of
that algorithm is patentable. 220 Accordingly, an invention may consti-
tute statutory subject matter, "even if the useful result [of the inven-
tion] is expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost,
or loss."221
After disposing of the mathematical algorithm exception, the
court targeted the business method exception. Noting that "[t]he
215 See id. at 1374-75.
216 Because an algorithm, like an abstract idea, does not actually accomplish a tangible
or useful result, it cannot have utility. See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea of itself is not patentable .. .
217 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374.
218 See id. at 1375.
219 See Rubber-Tip Penci4 87 U.S. (20 Wal.) at 507.
220 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373-75. Compare Rubber-Tip Penci4 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
at 507 ("An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made
practically useful is."), with State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 ("[T]he transformation of data
... by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations ... constitutes a practical
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces a
useful, concrete and tangible result...." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
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business method exception has never been invoked by [the Federal
Circuit], or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable," the court
decided to "take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to
rest."222 The court then observed that "[a ] pplication of this particular
exception has always been preceded by a ruling based on some clearer
concept of [the Patent Act] or, more commonly, application of the
abstract idea exception based on finding a mathematical
algorithm."223
Like its rejection of the mathematical algorithm exception, the
court's dismemberment of the business method exception reflects the
underlying premise that courts should not limit the patentable subject
matter under § 101 when congressional intent indicates an expansive
view of patentability.224 In discussing several of the cases purportedly
relying on the business method exception to invalidate a patent, the
court noted that the basis of the rejections in all the cases was either
that the patent merely claimed an abstract idea,2 25 or that the claimed
invention failed one of the novelty, utility, and nonobviousness re-
quirements of the Patent Act. 2 26 The court further stated:
Even the case frequently cited as establishing the business
method exception to statutory subject matter, Hotel Security Checking
Co. v. Lorraine Co., did not rely on the exception to strike the patent.
In that case, the patent was found invalid for lack of novelty and
"invention," not because it was improper subject matter for a
patent. 227
Rather than endorsing a special subject matter exception for business
methods, the Federal Circuit agreed with the most recent PTO patent
examination guidelines: "Claims should not be categorized as meth-
ods of doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like any
other process claims."228
Thus, the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank expressed its disap-
proval of subject matter exceptions beyond the traditional prohibi-
tions against patenting abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
225 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375-76; see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (rejecting the claimed invention as an abstract idea under the mathematical al-
gorithm exception); In reMeyer, 688 F.2d 789 (G.G.P.A. 1982) (same); In reMaucorps, 609
F.2d 481 (C.C.P.4. 1979) (same).
226 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375 & n.12; see also In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecting the patent for lack of novelty, without reaching the business
method exception); Dann v.Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (invalidating the patent under
§ 103's nonobviousness requirement, without reaching the business method exception).
227 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1376 (citation and footnote omitted).
228 Id. at 1377 (quoting Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61
Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996)).
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phenomena.2 29 In so doing, the Federal Circuit brought software-re-
lated inventions back under the aegis of traditional patent subject
matter analysis.23 0 Both business method and mathematical al-
gorithm claims that fall within the four enumerated classes of statu-
tory subject matter need only comply with the Patent Act's
requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness in order to gar-
ner patent protection.23 ' Such claims do not need to meet specialized
requirements of physical transformation or limit themselves to techni-
cal subject matter.23 2 As long as they claim practical applications of an
algorithm or a business method, rather than abstract ideas, they con-
stitute statutory subject matter.23 3 Additionally, the claims need not
fall into any particular classification of subject matter; they may claim
processes, machines, or articles of manufacture. 23 4
B. Implications for Software Patents
To gauge the potential impact of State Street Bank, one need only
look at the parties that filed amicus curiae briefs in the case. The
Information Technology Industry Council (ITI),235 as well as both
Visa and Mastercard, filed amicus briefs before the Federal Circuit.23 6
As of 1996, the PTO had issued 1331 patents covering banking and
business transactions 237 and undoubtedly issued countless more pat-
ents for other software programs. State Street Bank provides the hold-
ers of these patents with an unprecedented degree of certainty.
Perhaps more significantly, it has opened the door to countless other
inventors seeking patent protection for software-related inventions.
229 See id. at 1373 ("The repetitive use of the expansive term 'any' in § 101 shows Con-
gress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be
obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101.").
230 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
234 See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372 & n.2. Although this portion of the State Street
Bank decision was dictum because the claims at issue did indeed read on machines, the
Federal Circuit explicitly adopted that rationale in its later decision, AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that "the scope of § 101
[is] the same regardless of the form-machine or process-in which a particular claim is
drafted"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 368 (1999).
235 The Information Technology Industry Council "represents the leading U.S. provid-
ers of information technology products and services ... [which] had worldwide revenues
of $405 billion in 1996[,] ... employ more than 1.5 million in the United States... [and]
are responsible for.., over 50% of all information technology research and engineering."
About ITI, supra note 1. M has 28 members, including Apple Computer, Cisco Systems,
IBM, Sony Electronics, and Xerox. See id.
236 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1369-70
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
237 See ITIC Amicus Brief, supra note 24, at 13-14.
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Admittedly, the patent system may be less than a perfect vehicle
for protecting software-related inventions.238 However, no other ex-
isting regime can provide better protection for software-related inven-
tions;239 existing proposals for sui generis protection schemes suffer
both theoretical and practical deficiencies. 240 Consequently, patent
protection still presents the best scheme of protection for software-
related inventions.
The Federal Circuit's State Street Bank decision provides a new
level of certainty for inventors seeking protection for their software-
related inventions. 241 State Street Bank (and more explicitly, AT&T v.
Excel) disposed of the necessity of drafting claims in a particular man-
ner to obtain patent protection for software-related inventions. 242
Prior to the State Street Bank decision, claim format was often disposi-
tive in litigation involving a patent containing mathematical algo-
rithms.243 Scholars debated the relative merits of identifying
inventions by using process claims, machine claims, or article of man-
ufacture claims. 244 Some scholars advocated machine claims in the
means-plus-function format for software-related inventions. 245 Courts
238 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2343-47 (describing features unique to
software that render the present patent system an ineffective form of software protection).
Moreover, since the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank, many commentators in the
software and electronic commerce industries have declared the current patent system an
unfit method of protecting computer software and methods of conducting business trans-
actions online. See infra note 260.
239 See infra Part IIIAI.-3.
240 See infra Part IIIA4.
241 Amendments to the current Patent Act, however, could make the current patent
system even more amenable to the protection of software-related inventions. See infra Part
IIl.B.
242 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372; see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.) (discussing State Street Bank and concluding that
"whether the invention is a process or machine is irrelevant" for the purposes of § 101
analysis), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 368 (1999).
243 See Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 108-10 (noting that, under the Freeman-Water-Abele
test, software claims were virtually unpatentable without a physical structure in the claims,
forcing a claim format that presented the invention as a machine or article of manufac-
ture); Kass, supra note 49, at 830 (arguing that the Alappat court allowed the patentee's
claims primarily because they utilized means-plus-function format); Yoshida, supra note 43,
at 479 ("[C]ases decided subsequent to Diehr show that the substance of a program can
indeed be patented, as long as the claim description includes some reference to a means
for executing the program's functions.").
244 See Kass, supra note 49, at 807 ("Practitioners and commentators have developed
several approaches to satisfying the Benson, Rook, and Diehr requirement of physical trans-
formation for processes that involve mathematical algorithms. Such approaches usually
entail linking the algorithm or program with otherwise patentable subject matter to pig-
eon-hole the invention into a statutory category .. .
245 See id. at 850. Lawrence Kass explains:
If [a means-plus-function] claim format is accorded substantive effect, a
software or mathematical algorithm "process" claim, phrased as a "com-
puter means for" accomplishing the software or algorithm's function, be-
comes a "machine" claim, so long as the specification recites a computer.
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tended to view such claims as more "physical" than mere process
claims, which might not recite any physical structure at all.24 6 Other
scholars advocated describing software as an article of manufacture
and claiming a floppy disk as the invention, instead of the true inven-
tion, the program itself.2 47 These scholars asserted that the physical
changes in the disk caused by the software constituted the necessary
physical transformation to render a patent claim valid.2 48
State Street Bank and its progeny eliminated the need for such art-
ful drafting. In the words of the court, "for the purposes of a § 101
analysis, it is of little relevance whether [a patent's claim] is directed
to a 'machine' or a 'process,' as long as it falls within at least one of
the four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter," which
include processes, machines, and articles of manufacture.249 In the
wake of State Street Bank and AT&T, inventors are now free to claim
their inventions in whichever format provides the most effective
protection.
State Street Bank also dismissed the mathematical algorithm excep-
tion as an independent rationale to reject patent protection for
software-related inventions.2 50 Since its inception in Benson, the math-
ematical algorithm exception had proven a significant obstacle to in-
ventors seeking protection for software-related inventions. Moreover,
As a result, the claim would be automatically deemed patentable subject
matter under § 101.
Id. The patent at issue in In re Freeman successfully employed this strategy. See In re Free-
man, 573 F.2d 1237, 1238 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (validating claims framed in means-plus-func-
tion format, which covered "a system for typesetting alphanumeric information, using a
computer-based control system in conjunction with a phototypesetter of conventional
design").
246 See Kass, supra note 49, at 866 (noting that the courts have perpetuated a "legal
fiction of attributing physicality to software claims drafted in means-plus-function format"
and arguing that "the patent practitioner should always claim software inventions as ma-
chines or apparatuses in means-plus-function format"); Yoshida, supra note 43, at 479 (ar-
guing that the inclusion of physical means in claims has enabled inventors to claim
software that would not have been patentable if claimed as a process).
247 See, e.g, Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 114. ("[The article of manufacture claim
format] is preferable to providers of software products. It offers the same escape from the
mathematical algorithm/ [Freeman-Walter-Abele] difficulties and provides better enforce-
ment options than the machine format."). In re Beauregard features a patent that utilizes
the article of manufacture claim format. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (vacating the PTO Board's rejection of a patent that claimed a floppy disk en-
coded with a software program as an article of manufacture).
248 See Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 118-19 (discussing In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), and noting the Federal Circuit's reliance on "the physical changes in the me-
dium caused by the data structure" in its article of manufacture analysis).
249 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
... may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of [the
Patent Act].").
250 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373-75.
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when the inventors did manage to obtain patents for such inventions,
they faced uncertainty regarding the viability of those patents in in-
fringement actions.2 51 Now, however, the Federal Circuit, most often
the final authority on patent matters,2 52 has removed the hurdle of
the mathematical algorithm exception from the path of these
inventors.
Finally, State Street Bank also extinguished the controversial busi-
ness method exception. Although, as the Federal Circuit itself noted,
the PTO had already removed the business method exception from its
lexicon by the time of the State Street Bank decision,253 the exception
continued to haunt patent holders seeking to enforce patents claim-
ing business methods;2 54 indeed, respected authorities continued to
list business methods among the exceptions to statutory subject mat-
ter.2 55 In State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit finally decided to "lay
251 See Chiappetta, supra note 53, at 91 (describing mathematical algorithm jurispru-
dence as a "30-year quest for a solution"); Gable, supra note 88, at 22 ("Despite the
[Supreme] Court's express limitation, Benson had the consequence of suggesting that a
computer programs [sic] are unpatentable."); Yoshida, supra note 43, at 457 ("Since the
[Benson era], the [PTO] and the courts have struggled to resolve which computer pro-
gram-related inventions represent patentable subject matter and which fall under the ex-
ceptions to patentability relating to laws of nature and ideas.").
252 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. Moreover, because the Supreme
Court has denied State Street Bank's petition for certiorari, the Federal Circuit's State Street
Bank decision presently stands as a conclusive statement of the law. See State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.) (following and extending the
rationale of State Street Bank), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 368 (1999).
253 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1377. On the PTO's recent treatment of the business
method exception, the Federal Circuit noted:
[I]t comes as no surprise that in the most recent edition of the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP) (1996), a paragraph [authorizing
patent examiners to reject patents under the business method exception,]
was deleted.... This acknowledgement is buttressed by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark 1996 Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inven-
tions which now read:
Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed
to methods of doing business. Claims should not be categorized as methods of
doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like any other process
claims.
Id. (quoting Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478,
7479 (1996)).
254 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
515-16 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093
(1999). The district court in State Street Bank held:
Numerous patent treatises recite the long-established principle that busi-
ness plans and systems are not patentable .... In effect, the '056 Patent
grants Signature a monopoly on its idea of a multi-tiered partnership port-
folio investment structure .... Because such abstract ideas are not patenta-
ble ... as methods of doing business .... the '056 Patent must fail.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
255 See, e.g., 1 Cmsum, supra note 23, § 1.03[5], at 1-75 ("The decisions hold that busi-
ness 'plans' and 'systems' are not patentable, even though they may not be dependent
upon the aesthetic, emotional, or judgmental reactions of a human.").
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this ill-conceived exception to rest."256 As a result, the thousands of
patents covering business methods have gained newfound security.25 7
The State Street Bank decision's greatest significance lies in the cu-
mulative impact of the individual rules that it established. Taken to-
gether, the rejection of the business method exception, the limitation
of the mathematical algorithm exception, and the holding that claim
format is irrelevant with respect to the subject matter inquiry establish
software as deserving of patent protection as any other, traditional
technology. After State Street Bank, the PTO and courts will examine a
software-related invention under the traditional statutory require-
ments of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness; they will no longer scru-
tinize whether the invention includes a mathematical algorithm or
business method, or whether the claims are formatted as processes,
machines, or articles of manufacture. Thus, if a software-related in-
vention "produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result' ... , even if
the useful result is expressed in numbers," the invention exhibits the
qualities that the Framers of the Constitution, as well as Congress, es-
tablished as prerequisites for awarding a patent monopoly.2 58
III
PATENT: THE OPTIMAL FoRM OF PROTECTION
FOR SoFtWARE?
State Street Bank's elevation of software to the ranks of generally
patentable technologies raises the issue of whether software should be
eligible for such patent protection. The Federal Circuit certainly sup-
ports software patentability, as long as the claims meet the novelty,
utility, and nonobviousness requirements of the Patent Act. Commen-
tators, however, do not universally agree.
Scholars have raised various arguments against affording patent
protection to software-related inventions. Some point to the success
of the software industry to date, despite the absence of the certainty of
patent protection provided by State Street Bank.259 Others acknowl-
256 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
257 Of course, the decision to finally provide certain protection to business method
patents has engendered controversy of its own. See infra note 260.
258 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375 (quoting In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
259 See, e.g., Against Software Patents: The League for Programming Freedom, 14 HASNGS
Comm. & ENr. LJ. 297, 297 n.* (1992) ("New monopolies, known as software patents ....
have taken away our freedom of expression and our ability to do a good job."); Lee A.
Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for Congressional Action on Software Patents, 24
AIPLA QJ. 283, 285 (1996) (noting that "[p]ast commentators have questioned the need
for, or advisability of, patents for software-based inventions" and discussing the reasons for
their skepticism). Similarly, Professor Goldstein has noted that anyone trying to promote
enhanced intellectual protection for software "will need to explain why-if copyright, pat-
ent, and trade secret law are so lacking-there was such an extraordinary outpouring of
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edge that market failures inherent to the software market may prevent
the full growth of the software industry without some form of intellec-
tual property protection, but argue that patent protection is not the
best remedy for these failures.2 60 Assuming that software needs some
software innovation during the 1980s, when no alternative forms of intellectual property
protection were in prospect." Paul Goldstein, Comment, Comments on A Manifesto Con-
cerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2573, 2575
(1994).
260 For example, Professor Samuelson and her colleagues argue that software inven-
tions are categorically incompatible with the patent system and claim that suitable protec-
tion for software can only be found in a new, sui generis regime:
[T] he more profound problem with using patent law to protect functional
program behavior, user interfaces, and the industrial design of programs
that produce behavior is that these innovations are typically of an incre-
mental sort.... Patent law requires an inventive advance over the prior art
before it grants protection. Protecting incremental innovations in program
behavior through patent law would thwart the economic goals of the patent
system: to grant exclusive rights only when an innovator has made a sub-
stantial contribution to the art and advanced competition to a new level.
Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2346 (footnotes omitted). Another school of thought
disagrees about the necessity and appropriateness of sui generis protection for software,
but agrees with Professor Samuelson that patents do not provide the proper protection for
software inventions. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Comment, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The
Manifest Superiority of Copyight over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 CoLuM. L.
REv. 2559, 2572 (1994) ("[lit is not at all clear that a noncopyright 'fix' to the system of
software protection is available, or desirable, at least as a matter of U.S. law.").
More recently, several commentators have criticized the post-State Street Bank patent
system, arguing that it allows patents for developments in software and electronic com-
merce that should not be patentable. For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 ('411 Pat-
ent), granted on September 28, 1999 and assigned to Amazon.com, Inc., covers
Amazon.com's "one click" ordering system. See U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 to Hartman et
al., issued Sept. 28, 1999 (Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order via a Commu-
nications Network). Under this system, a customer seeking to purchase an item from Ama-
zon.com's electronic commerce site need only click one button to effect the transaction,
bypassing numerous data entry and confirmation steps. Within a month after receiving the
patent, Amazon.com filed for and ultimately received a preliminary injunction against
competitor Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., who used a similar system to facilitate transactions
with its customers. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d
1228, 1249 (W.D. Wash. 1999). Many insiders in the software and electronic commerce
industries have criticized both the '411 Patent and the Amazon.com decision, arguing that
allowing Amazon.com a patent on such a noninventive development awards Amazon.com
an undeserved monopoly and retards the development of the electronic commerce indus-
try as a whole. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Patent Problems, STANDARD 6 (Jan. 21, 2000)
<http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,8999,00.html>. Professor Lessig
argues:
[A patent on a method of online commerce, such as Amazon.com's "one
click"] gives the holder a monopoly over a way of doing business that gets
instantiated in technology. That's troubling enough in real space, where
not all ways of doing business can be expressed in technology. But in cyber-
space, there is no limit to the potential of this sort of patent. Every method
of doing business in cyberspace by definition is instantiated in technol-
ogy-code. So every method in principle becomes subject to a patent.
Id. However, this Note argues that a distorted interpretation of subject matter under § 101
is not necessary to address the concerns with electronic commerce patents; the other re-
quirements for patentability-novelty, utility, and nonobviousness-adequately address
these concerns. See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text. Many of the arguments
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form of intellectual property protection, commentators have posited
several alternatives to patent law: trade secret law,261 copyright law,262
trademark law,2 63 and sui generis protection schemes.2 64 However,
none of these existing alternatives to patent law can fully protect
software, and the theoretical infirmities and administrative difficulties
of a sui generis protection scheme will likely prove insurmountable.2 65
A closer analysis of the alternatives to patent protection reveals that
against software and electronic commerce patents focus on the fact that these patents
often contain insufficient "inventive" material to deserve monopoly protection, see, e.g.,
Seth Shulman, Software Patents Tangle the Web, TECH. REv., 1 9 (Mar./Apr. 2000) <http://
www.techreview.com/articles/maOO/shulman.htm> ("'The Patent Office is issuing patents
for blindingly obvious things just because they are being done with software or on the
Internet.' . . . [T]he patents are already causing 'a chilling effect on electronic com-
merce.'" (quoting Professor James Boyle of American University)), or the PTO's inability
to effectively uncover prior art that might render the patented invention obvious or non-
novel, see, id. 11 22-29. Shulman notes:
A key problem is that software programming-especially in its early days-
was famous for its lack of a published paper trail and for the informal ex-
change of code and techniques among programmers. These poor "non-
patent" records, combined with the PTO's late arrival to the software game,
mean the agency examiners who scrutinize applications often have tremen-
dous difficulty establishing exactly when an invention was first made.
Id., 1 23. This Note argues that the past confusion over whether algorithms and business
methods are statutory subject matter has improperly shifted the focus from the analysis of
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit's State Street Bank decision should
refocus attention on these traditional requirements. More importantly, the inter partes
examination procedure advocated in this Note, see infra notes 347-49 and accompanying
text, would allow interested third parties to intervene in the examination process, drawing
to the attention of the PTO any relevant prior art that might render the patent at issue
obvious or non-novel. These two factors, working in conjunction, would ensure that every
patent granted by the PTO is truly meritorious.
261 See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 3, 1 5-6 (explaining that, because of the patent
system's past ineffectiveness at protecting software, many software "developers were accus-
tomed to maintaining their algorithms and software code as closely guarded secrets").
262 For example, Professor Ginsburg argues:
[T]he ... essential premise that copyright law ill befits computer programs
because the law does not protect works that 'behave,' betrays too cramped
an appreciation of the subject matter and scope of copyright protection.
Copyright does, to some extent, protect 'behavior,' whether of computer
programs or of other works of authorship.
Ginsburg, supra note 260, at 2559-60. Professor Miller also advocates copyright protection
for software:
Computer programs and other more traditional literary works, and the
processes by which they are created, are quite similar. Computer programs,
like other literary works, are expressive. The imagination, originality, and
creativity involved in writing a program is comparable to that involved in
more time-honored literary works and far exceeds various mundane efforts
that have long enjoyed protection under the copyright rubric.
Miller, supra note 19, at 983-84 (footnotes omitted).
263 See, e.g., Kellner, supra note 19, at 1013 ("[C]omputer and software manufacturers
should look to trade dress law [a subset of trademark law] to protect the 'look and feel' of
their user interfaces.").
264 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, passim see also id. at 2312 n.6 (listing various
proposals and articles on su generis protection of softvare).
265 See infra Part III.A.4.
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while some of them complement patent law in protecting software-
related inventions, none of them can effectively replace the vital role
patent law plays in protecting software.
A. Alternative Forms of Protection
1. Trade Secret
One traditional method that software developers have frequently
used to secure their intellectual property is trade secrecy.266 The Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act provides:
"Trade secret" means information, including a... program... that
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertain-
able by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances to maintain its secrecy.2 6 7
A distinguishing feature of trade secrecy is the fact that developers
need not, and in fact must not, disclose the protected information to
secure protection.268 This feature represents both the advantage and
the disadvantage of trade secret protection.
The prohibition against disclosure seems to provide a great bene-
fit to developers. Not only do they get protection for their software,
but in so doing they also need not even disclose how they produced it.
In contrast, to obtain patent protection, developers must disclose
their inventions, potentially allowing others the opportunity to im-
prove upon them. In fact, perhaps because of the past uncertainty
regarding software patents, much of the software development com-
munity accepted this rationale and kept many, if not most, software
development efforts secret.2 69
Unfortunately, the mandate of secrecy actually works against the
developers and even society as a whole. Rather than promoting infor-
mation exchange and technological innovation, trade secrecy encour-
ages developers to hoard their inventions; this forces software
developers to "spend much of their efforts reinventing the wheel be-
cause there is not an adequate collection of how problems have been
266 See McDonald, supra note 3, 11 6-7.
267 UNw. TRADE SECRETS Ac § 1(4), 14 U.LA. 438 (1990).
268 Compare idi § 1 (4) (ii) (requiring "efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain [the] secrecy" of the invention or information to qualify for trade
secret protection), with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring "a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art... to make and use the
same" to qualify for patent protection).
269 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 286 (noting that "[u] ntil recently, patents were dis-
couraged and commercial developers kept their work secret").
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solved in the past."27 0 While the software industry has prospered in
the absence of proper patent protection, even greater innovation
might have occurred had patent protection been available as a viable
source of protection.271 In fact, Lee Hollaar, a professor of computer
science at the University of Utah,272 claims that despite the growth of
the software industry, "much software development has not been par-
ticularly innovative"27 3 and attributes the massive growth in the indus-
try to the availability and rapid development of more powerful, less
expensive computer hardware.274 This is perhaps due in part to the
ease with which hardware manufacturers can patent new computer
hardware inventions. Thus, even though individual software develop-
ers might have greatly benefitted from the protection of trade secrecy,
the basic policy goals behind intellectual property protection demand
a form of protection that encourages more information exchange and
synergy between competing developers.275 Although other intellec-
tual property protection schemes may allow disclosure and the resul-
tant sharing of information, only one existing scheme requires them:
patent law.2 76
2. Trademark
Trade dress is a form of trademark protection designed to protect
the "look and feel" of products and their packaging.2 77 As such, it has
the potential to provide protection for the aesthetic aspects of
270 Id.
271 See id.; see also McDonald, supra note 3, 1 8 ("[Trade] secrecy creates barriers to
innovation and progress within the software industry.").
272 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 283 n.*.
273 Id. at 285.
274 See id. at 285-86.
275 The ultimate goal of the intellectual property protection system in the United
States is not to reward inventors, but to encourage innovation. See supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
276 While the Copyright Act provides for deposit and registration of copyrighted works,
see 17 U.S.C. §§ 407-412 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), "[s]uch registration is not a condition of
copyright protection," id. § 408(a). However, registration may be a prerequisite to some
infringement claims. See id. § 412. In contrast, patent law requires disclosure of the inven-
tion as a prerequisite to receiving any type of protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
277 Trade dress protection arises out of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the federal
trademark statute codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McGArTH
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMP TIION § 8.01[5] (3d ed. 1996). Section 43(a) is often
referred to as a federal unfair competition law. See GOLDSTmN, supra note 72, at 363. In
ruling on a trade dress infringement claim, a judge should look at "the total image or
overall impression of plaintiff's product," in comparison with that of the defendant's prod-
uct. 1 McCARTHY, supra, § 8.01 [1] [a], at 8-2. If the defendant's product "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion" between the plaintiff's product and the defendant's, then the plaintiff's claim should
succeed. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (A) (1994).
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software interfaces. 278 Although trade dress protection has not been
extensively tested in the computer software context,279 at least one
commentator feels that it holds great potential for protecting the aes-
thetic aspects of computer programs.280
However, under trademark law, trade dress protection does not
extend to the functional characteristics of a product.28 ' Thus, while
trade dress may be able to protect the user interface of a particular
software application, it necessarily falls short of protecting the vital
functionality of the application. Protecting functionality is hence the
exclusive domain of patent protection. Nevertheless, trade dress pro-
tection may serve as an ideal complement: By patenting the "guts" of
the program and obtaining trade dress protection for the look and
feel of the interface, a software developer may be able to secure com-
prehensive protection for the entire application.
3. Copyright
Some developers have attempted to rely on the copyright laws to
protect the software code itself.2 82 However, copyright, like trade-
mark, is designed to protect not the functional characteristics of in-
ventions, but merely "the literal expression of the software code."283
In fact, the First Circuit in a recent case held that, while "'[i] t is now
well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their
278 Laura Kellner notes the advantage of trade dress protection over copyright
protection:
Copyright law protects individual static elements, but not composite dy-
namic wholes. Conversely, trade dress law, a subset of trademark law, pro-
tects composite wholes because trade dress is the "look and feel" of a
product or its packaging. Where copyright law has failed to protect user
interfaces, trademark law might succeed.
Kellner, supra note 19, at 1013.
279 See id. at 1017 ("While trade dress infringement claims have become more common
in all product areas over the past few years, only a few attorneys have aggressively sought
trade dress protection for the 'look and feel' of user interfaces. Most plaintiffs in these
cases simply do not pursue trademark protection at all." (footnote omitted)).
280 See id. at 1013 (describing the protection of "'look and feel' of a product" under
trade dress law).
281 See i& at 1026 (admitting that, "[t]o prevail in a trademark case, the manufacturer
[of the software] must also demonstrate that the trade dress it seeks to protect is 'nonfunc-
tional'"); cf. Michael J. Schallop, Comment, Protecting User lnterfaces: Not as Easy as 1-2-3, 45
EMORY LJ. 1533, 1536 (1996) (arguing that "a user interface's functional method of oper-
ating a computer should not be protected by copyright, trademark, or trade dress, because
... such functionality constitutes patentable subject matter and should be protected, if at
all, by patent law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
282 See McDonald, supra note 3, 1 7 ("Absent patent protection for the software's un-
derlying idea or concept, developers have relied on the copyright laws to protect the actual
expression of the algorithm in the form of the software code itself.").
288 Id. 1 9. But see Miller, supra note 19, at 986 ("Works with utilitarian aspects, how-
ever, have been accorded protection since our first Copyright Act in 1790, which embraced
maps and charts.... Since [Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880)], courts have reaffirmed
repeatedly that functionality poses no per se bar to copyrightability." (footnotes omitted)).
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source and object codes, are the subject of copyright protection,"' 284
no functional elements of the program may be copyrightable because
they fall within the "'method of operation"' exception to
copyrightability. 28 5
Section 102 (b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 excludes from copy-
right protection "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied."2 6 More-
over, the legislative history of that section clearly indicates that only
the actual expression of the software developer-the program's
source and object codes and possibly aesthetic interface-and not the
underlying functionality of the program deserves copyright protec-
tion.28 7 Nevertheless, some scholars still champion copyright as the
preeminent form of protection for software.288 However, since the
First Circuit's ruling in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,
Inc.,28 9 an increasing number of commentators have advocated scaling
back copyright protection so as to cover only the literal program code,
284 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 n.11 (1st Cir. 1995) (quot-
ing Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992)), aff'd by an
equally divided cour 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam). For descriptions of source code and
object code, see infra note 287.
285 Lotus Dev., 49 F.3d at 816.
286 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
287 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 10 (1976), repinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670
("Section 102(b) is intended . . . to make clear that the expression adopted by the
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright
law.").
A software developer normally writes a computer program in a higher-level program-
ming language-one that is understandable to humans, but not executable on a computer.
This manifestation of the program is called source code. SeeLotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990). For a computer to understand the
program code, the developer must "compile" the code with another program known, ap-
propriately enough, as a compiler. The compiled program code is called object code. See
id. The computer can understand and execute the object code, expressed in binary form.
See id. at 43-44. The "user interface" is the program's presentation to the user, with which
the user interacts via, for example, a mouse, keyboard, and monitor. Conceptually, a pro-
gram's source or object code, user interface, and functionality are distinct That is, the
same functionality can be obtained via different user interfaces or source code.
288 See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Commentary, Comments on A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 5 ALa. LJ. Sci. & TEcH. 277, 280 (1996)
("[The primary criticism of] the suitability of copyright protection for computer programs
relates to the fact that programs have the utilitarian objective to achieve functional results
in an efficient way. Yet copyright has never been regarded as an inappropriate protective
regime for other works that have functional objectives." (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Note, however, that Professor Gorman wrote this article before the
Supreme Court's affirmance of Lotus Developmen in which the First Circuit limited the
scope of protection to nonfunctional elements of the software. See Lotus Dev., 49 F.3d at
815-19.
289 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided cour4 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per
curiam).
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in either source or object form, and using patent protection to fill the
resulting void.290
Conceptually, this approach makes the most sense. The goal of
copyright law is to protect nonfunctional, expressive works, while pat-
ent law seeks to protect only functional technology.291 Thus, stretch-
ing copyright law to cover functional properties of software makes
little sense. Additionally, from a policy standpoint, it would be unwise
to grant a monopoly on functional behavior which does not meet the
rigorous standards of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness under pat-
ent law.2 92
Copyright serves a valuable function in the protection of software-
related inventions by prohibiting literal copying of either the execut-
able program code or the source code for the software. It also pro-
tects some elements of the user interface. But after Lotus Development,
copyright can no longer viably protect the underlying functionality of
the software itself; in many cases, the underlying functionality is the
software's primary source of value.29 3 Functionality is the domain of
patent law; unless Congress legislates a sui generis protection scheme,
290 See, e.g., Dennis S. Kaijala, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Structure, 64
BRooK. L. REv. 519, 522 (1998) ("[C]opyright should protect computer program code
from verbatim copying or slavish mechanical or electronic translations. [Ifo]ther program
elements, such as structure, sequence, and organization ('SO') and elements of software
interfaces. . . are to receive intellectual property protection at all, that protection should
be sought in patent... law. .. ."); McDonald, supra note 3, 8 ("Copyright law is designed
to protect the individual expression of an idea rather than the idea itself.").
291 Congress's power to grant both patents and copyrights arises out of Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). Upon
enacting the 1952 Patent Act, Congress noted:
The background, the balanced construction, and the usage current
then and later, indicate that the constitutional provision is really two provi-
sions merged into one. The purpose of the first provision is to promote the
progress of science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive
right to their writings, the word "science" in this connection having the
meaning of knowledge in general, which is one of its meanings today. The
other provision is that Congress has the power to promote the progress of
useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries. The first patent law and all patent laws up to a much later
period were entitled "Acts to promote the progress of useful arts."
S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 3 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.CAN. 2394, 2396; H.R. REP. No.
82-1923, at 4 (1952).
292 In fact, this Note argues that providing protection for the functional aspects of
software without meeting the Patent Act's standard of inventiveness violates the Patent
Clause of the Constitution. See infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
293 For example, the most valuable part of Signature's invention in State Street Bank was
the software's functional ability to track the assets and losses of the various mutual funds.
See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denie, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). While the interface was certainly important, the
underlying processes provided the software's inherent value.
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patent law provides the only comprehensive protection for the func-
tional aspects of a software application.
4. Sui Generis Protection Schemes
Some commentators claim that the existing intellectual property
protection regimes cannot effectively protect software-related inven-
tions and argue that a new, sui generis scheme is necessary for
software protection. 294 Proponents of the sui generis protection
scheme for software contend that "the incremental nature of innova-
tion in software largely precludes patent protection."295 They liken
software to semiconductors and point to the congressional adoption
of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 to protect semicon-
ductor-related inventions296 as evidence that existing regimes cannot
adequately protect computer-related inventions.2 97
294 The most recent and comprehensive proposal for sui generis protection of software
inventions is A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs. Samuelson et
al., supra note 20. In this seminal article, the authors, comprised of lawyers and computer
experts, surveyed the various existing modes of intellectual property protection and con-
cluded that the existing intellectual property legal regimes failed to properly protect
software. See id. at 2429-31. Moreover, they argue that patent law and copyright detract
from one another by attempting to coexist in the software realm:
In addition, the application of both copyright and patent law to
software innovations may impair the effectiveness of both forms of protec-
tion. It has also created considerable uncertainty about the scope of protec-
tion available from each. No one knows just where the boundary line
between these domains does or should lie. The economic goals of both
regimes can be thwarted when both are applied to a dual-character subject
matter such as computer programs. This is especially true if copyright law,
with its long duration of protection, its low creativity threshold, and its auto-
matic protection, is construed so broadly that it encompasses technical in-
novations that should be regulated by patent law.
Id. at 2346-47 (footnotes omitted). The Manifesto represents the most persuasive and com-
plete argument against software patent protection and in favor of a new system of protec-
tion. In addition, it represents one of the few recent proposals for sui generis protection of
software. See id. at 2312-13 (conceding that "the idea of sui generis protection for software
has generally fallen out of favor"). Thus, this Note will discuss sui generis protection pri-
marily in light of the Manifestos arguments.
295 Id. at 2333.
296 Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 302, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-
914 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
297 The Manifesto makes the following analogy between software and semiconductor
chips:
Congress recognized that the chip industry's products were ... vulnerable
to rapid imitative copying that undermined innovators' ability to recoup
research and development costs... [S] oftware resembles "semiconductor
chips whose industrial designs are rarely inventive.... To provide proper
incentives for semiconductor designs, Congress passed the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA). It may eventually need to do the same
for computer software, where the typically incremental nature of innova-
tion also impedes the utility of patent protection.
Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2346 (footnote omitted).
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A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (the
"Manifestd') by Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and
J.H. Reichman advances three arguments against using patent law to
protect software inventions.298 The first argument concerns the sub-
ject matter hurdle a software developer traditionally had to clear
under § 101 before securing patent protection.299 Through a series of
decisions culminating in State Street Bank, however, the Federal Circuit
has conclusively established that software-related inventions are
proper patentable subject matter, provided they meet the other re-
quirements of the Patent Act.300 As a result, the Federal Circuit has
rendered moot the Manifesto's subject matter argument.
The Manifesto's second argument contends that, because software
inventions are most often innovative rather than inventive in nature,
patent protection is inevitably underinclusive and overinclusive.301 In
other words, some undoubtedly valuable software innovations may not
qualify for patent protection because they fail to meet the Patent Act's
requirements of novelty, utility, or nonobviousness, 30 2 while others re-
serve too great a monopoly, stifling innovation.303
298 See id. at 2308.
299 See id. at 2344-45 ("[Tlhe Patent Office for nearly two decades, refused patent ap-
plications for software innovations on subject matter grounds. The U.S. Supreme Court
seemed to concur in this legal position, and its decisions influenced the patent policies of
other nations." (footnote omitted)).
300 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374-75
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting previous statutory subject matter barriers to a software-related
patent, as long as it produces "a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result'" and meets the
utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements of the Patent Act), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
301 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2331 ("While innovation in program design
occasionally rises to the level of invention, most often it does not."). The authors of the
Manifesto use the word " ' innovative' to describe products of skilled effort that advance the
state of the art but do not meet the patent standard of nonobviousness." Id. at 2330 n.67.
302 See id. at 2346 ("[Tlhe more profound problem with using patent law to protect
functional program behavior, user interfaces, and the industrial design of programs... is
that these innovations are typically of an incremental sort. ... Patent law requires an
inventive advance over the prior art before it grants protection." (footnote omitted)).
303 The Manifesto reasons that, because "Iilt is quite possible to produce functionally
indistinguishable program behaviors through use of more than one method[,] ... holding
a patent on one method of generating certain results could not prevent the use of another
method, even if those results were the program's principal source of value." Id. at 2345
(footnote omitted). In order to prevent other developers from developing around a
software patent, the PTO could allow developers to patent the results of the process, in-
stead of the process itself. However, the Manifesto notes that course of action has the po-
tential to stifle competition:
Yet if the Patent and Trademark Office were willing to issue a patent with
claims for any means of achieving a particular set of results, such a patent
would issue at a high level of generality and would inhibit competition in
development of useful program behaviors out of proportion to the innova-
tion actually contributed by the claimant.
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In opposition to this view, Professor Hollaar asserts that the lack
of adequate patent protection has created the current development
environment in which software advances are incremental and evolu-
tionary, as opposed to inventive and revolutionary. 30 4 Under his the-
ory, if software developers could rely on patent protection, they would
be more willing to disclose their inventions and help produce more
rapid, inventive developments in the software field.3 0 5 Thus, the prob-
lem of incremental innovation in the software field is not necessarily
an argument against patent protection for software, but is more likely
a symptom of the historical absence of predictable patent protection
for software-related inventions. 306
Further, Professor Hollaar argues that if more developers secured
patent protection for their software-related inventions, other develop-
ers' "concern over patent infringement could . . .accelerate[] the
trend in the computer system development industry towards using
software modules purchased from [the patent-holding] develop-
ers."30 7 The modular software development techniques, which have
recently gained momentum with the adoption of C++ and other ob-
ject-oriented languages,308 encourage code reuse to promote faster
304 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 286-88 (arguing that, because of the lack of active
patent protection of software, software developers must practice their trade in secrecy and
"spend much of their efforts reinventing the wheel because there is not an adequate collec-
tion of how problems have been solved in the past").
305 See id. at 286 ("An active patent system for software-related technology would make
[existing software-development] techniques known. Then others could improve upon a
patent or 'invent around' a patent by using new solutions.").
306 See Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 24, at 256-59. Mark Lemley and David O'Brien
argue that the "public goods problem" has stifled the creation of reusable, patentable
software components. Id. at 268-69. Under the public goods problem, "the costs of exclu-
sion are high," so that inventors cannot easily exclude free riders from benefiting from the
good; "consumption of the good is 'nonrivalrous,'" so that the good is nondepletable and
thus never gains value through scarcity. Id. at 268. The reason for this problem, they
contend, is that "[u]p until now, legal doctrine has not optimally encouraged software
reuse." Id. at 304. They conclude that the shift toward patent protection for software is
encouraging "because it promises to couple strong protection for novel [software] compo-
nents with a free market in interoperability." Id.
307 Hollaar, supra note 259, at 287. Professor Hollaar speculates that, if developers
feared liability for patent infringement in actions filed by other developers, they might be
more willing to negotiate for a license on existing software inventions, rather than building
them from scratch. See id. at 286-87. However, the danger of becoming the subject of an
infringement action has been historically low, due to both the relative paucity of software-
related patents and the uncertainty of their validity. Cf. McDonald, supra note 3, 1 6-9
(describing software developers' traditional aversion to relying on the patent system for
software protection and analyzing the detrimental results of the patent system's historical
failure to protect software). State Street Bank has changed this calculus, and the fear of
infringement will become a strong motive once software developers begin to utilize the
newfound security of patent protection.
308 C++ is the object-oriented extension to the C programming language. See Hollaar,
supra note 259, at 287 n.12. The majority of modem consumer software applications are
either in C or C++. Java and Visual Basic, two other popular software development lan-
guages, both use the object-oriented paradigm. See GARY CoRNELu, VIsuAL BAsic 5 FROM
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and more efficient programming practices and development cycles. 30 9
In turn, more efficient development enables more rapid innovation
and an overall improvement in the rate of growth in the computer
software sector. Moreover, the new object-oriented programming par-
adigm of software development "seems to be the dominant program-
ming paradigm these days, having replaced the structured
programming techniques that were developed in the early 1970s";310
and it is better suited to patent protection than earlier, structured pro-
gramming techniques.3 11 Because a software module accomplishes a
discrete task, a novel, useful, and nonobvious module is more readily
identifiable and patentable than a new innovation encompassed
within a larger, older program.3 12
Thus, while the Manifesto argues that the incremental progress of
the state of the art in software precludes effective patent protection, a
better view might be that affording patent protection to software
would allow the software industry to break away from the incremental
THE GROUND Up 374-75 (1997); 1 CAY S. HoRsrMANN & GARY CoR au., COREJAVA: FUNDA-
NiETm-s 104-05 (1997).
Object-oriented programming has largely replaced the old, structured programming
paradigm. See CoRNELL, supra, at 374; 1 HoRmANN & CoRNEtL., supra, at 104. Structured
programming develops specialized, highly interrelated data structures and manipulates the
application-specific data with algorithms. See 1 HoRsrMANN & CoRNELt, supra, at 105. This
structured approach allows for a high degree of specialization, but requires developers to
write substantially from scratch the entire code for a particular application. In contrast,
under the object-oriented programming paradigm, software developers design programs
as collections of independent modules, each of which performs a discrete task. These
independent modules communicate with each other through standard interfaces, so that
they can easily be reused without modification. See id. Thus, if a developer creates a novel
and useful module, the developer can obtain patent protection for the module and subse-
quently license its use to other developers.
309 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 287 ("The use of purchased modules or libraries not
only minimizes concerns about patent infringement, but can result in faster software devel-
opment. Further, because the module developer can spend more effort producing a com-
prehensive program, greater capabilities or more efficient operations can result.").
310 CoRNE, supra note 308, at 374.
311 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 287-88 ("The patent system provides protection that
is well suited for object-oriented programming.... Concern over patent infringement can
encourage the use of object-oriented programming... ."); Lemley & O'Brien, supra note
24, at 294 ("Patent law is more consistent [than other forms of protection, in particular
copyright,] with the development of a [software] components market."). The Manifesto
argues that software is not amenable to patent protection because "[t]he products of
software engineering almost invariably contain admixtures of old and new elements. Some
consist almost entirely of old elements." Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2332. How-
ever, under the object-oriented program paradigm the individual elements of a program
are readily divisible, allowing analysis of those elements for novelty, utility, and nonobvious-
ness. The developer can then seek patent protection for elements that pass muster. See
Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 24, at 295 ("Most patentable inventions in computer science
are not whole software programs but particular ideas or approaches to specific problems.
Entire software programs are unlikely to be protected by patent law, but the components
[of the software] themselves... will probably qualify for patent protection.").
312 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 287 (arguing that "[t] ruly innovative techniques for
manipulating a data structure can be protected as processes").
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improvement model and experience truly inventive progress. Addi-
tionally, modem, object-oriented programming techniques more eas-
ily lend themselves to inventive advances and therefore to patent
protection.313 Granting patent protection to software would thus en-
courage this type of development and would introduce a self-reinforc-
ing cycle of enhanced inventiveness in the software industry.
Furthermore, "dividing property entitlements by patenting software
components may leave the developers of integrated software pro-
grams no choice but to negotiate licensing agreements with others in
the industry, '3 14 stimulating an increase in software technology shar-
ing and resulting in further progress in the software industry.3 15
Finally, the Manifesto argues that unique characteristics of
software render the patent system administratively unmanageable as a
vehicle for its protection.3 16 However, these arguments are true for
patents in general, notjust for software inventions.3 17 Admittedly, the
patent system is not perfect.3 18 However, this Note argues that the
present patent system even with its imperfections is capable of effec-
tively dealing with software-related inventions and is therefore prefera-
ble to a sui generis protection scheme, which is untested and for
which there is no persuasive justification. Moreover, if the present
system proves administratively unworkable for software, it will surely
be an easier task for Congress to simply update the Patent Act than to
promulgate a wholly new sui generis protection scheme for
software.3 19 Instead of underscoring the need to create a new system
313 See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
314 Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 24, at 295.
315 See id. at 295-96.
316 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2345-46 n.134 (claiming that "the high costs
and long delays required to obtain [patent] protection for program innovations" are often
prohibitive, especially for small developers with limited resources). In addition, the Mani-
festo argues, "If and when a patent finally issues, it may also come after the useful commer-
cial life of the product embodying the innovation, because of the fast pace of innovation in
the industry." Id. at 2346 n.134. Consequently, the Manifesto proposes "[a] form of legal
protection for the first years of a technical innovation in software [that] would, accord-
ingly, be better tailored to the needs of software entrepreneurs." Id.
317 See Hollaar, supra note 259, at 285 ("If those complaints have merit, Congress
should address them by reforming the patent system as a whole, not by excluding one area
of technology."). On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has a history of vacillating on the
issue of software patents. See supra Part I.B-C.
318 For suggestions on possible improvements to the Patent Act, see infra Part III.B.
319 See Goldstein, supra note 259, at 2575 (suggesting that the sui generis scheme of
Samuelson and her colleagues will have to overcome substantial congressional inertia
against change). Professor Gorman's doubts about the efficacy of the Manifesto's proposal
are more fundamental:
I am doubtful, however, that the sui generis legal regime the [Mani-
festo's] authors propose is warranted or practicable. If the Mantfesto's basic
premise-that copyright does not provide meaningful protection, and thus
economic incentives, for the computer program designer-is unsound,
then the argument for supplemental sui generis protection is fundamentally
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of protection, administrative concerns thus justify maintaining and
updating the current patent system.
B. Proposed Amendments to the Patent Act
This Note argues that, after State Street Bank and subsequently
AT&T, the patent system represents an adequate protection scheme
for software-related inventions. 320 However, it is by no means perfect.
As Justice Douglas noted in Benson, software patentability raises issues
that can best be resolved by congressional action.321 While recent
Federal Circuit decisions, most importantly State Street Bank, have clari-
fied many of the conundrums in past software patentability doc-
trine,3 22 judicial action cannot so easily solve other problems endemic
to the patent system. Amending the Patent Act3 23 might be a better
solution to these deficiencies; the State Street Bank decision provides
valuable guideposts for Congress to follow.
This Note suggests two possible amendments to the Patent Act.
The first proposal would simply codify the holding of State Street Bank.
The second, more controversial proposal would remedy problems that
plague patent applicants generally. Several commentators have pro-
posed changes to the Patent Act,32 4 and this Note adopts elements of
their suggestions with some modifications.
weakened. I believe that to be the case. I also believe that, if such a new
legal regime were to be created, it would add little to-and would in impor-
tant respects seriously conflict with-the intellectual property regimes al-
ready long in place. Finally, I believe that the Manifesto proposal presents
serious practical difficulties of implementation.
Gorman, supra note 288, at 278-79.
320 This Section argues that since these decisions, the patent system has emerged as
the best available protection for software-related inventions. For other options that have
been suggested, see supra Part III.A.
321 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) ("If [computer] programs are to
be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can
manage .... The technological problems [inherent to software] indicate to us that consid-
ered action by the Congress is needed." (footnotes omitted)).
322 For instance, many scholars had viewed both the business method and the mathe-
matical algorithm exceptions as per se bars to software patentability. See supra Part I.B-C.
However, the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank conclusively held that these doctrines
should not prevent the patenting of otherwise patentable software inventions. See supra
Part H. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has a history of vacillating on the issue of
software patents. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
323 For instance,judicial action cannot remedy the Manifesto's contention that the time
delay between patent application and patent issuance acts as a de facto bar to software
patents for many small developers. See supra note 316. This problem stems from PTO
procedures and is a deficiency that redress by litigation will never be able to address. How-
ever, congressional restructuring of the patent examination process could alleviate the
problem. See infra Part III.B.2 (proposing procedures that would streamline the statutory
scheme for protection of software patents).
324 See, e.g., Hollaar, supra note 259, at 297 ("By making three simple changes to the
patent statute, Congress can clarify the patentability of software-based inventions and en-
hance their protection."); Stem, supra note 20, at 213 (proposing a "petty-patent system
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1. Explicitly Define Software as Patentable Subject Matter
The historical animosity and subsequent uncertainty exhibited by
both the PTO and courts toward software-related inventions have
been problematic to the patent system.3 25 The State Street Bank deci-
sion settled the confusion by returning to the traditional patentable
subject matter analysis for software-related inventions and dispensing
with both the mathematical algorithm and business method excep-
tions.3 26 While this Note applauds the Federal Circuit's decisive ac-
tion in Stizte Street Bank, its decision, while persuasive, 32 7 does not carry
the same weight as an affirmative statement by Congress.328
To ensure the continued viability of the State Street Bank holding,
Congress should amend the Patent Act to explicitly embrace software
as patentable subject matter. Congress has at least three options for
promoting software patentability. First, it could define mathematical
algorithms and business methods as separate categories of patentable
subject matter under § 102. Second, it could clearly indicate in its
legislative history that while software is not patentable per se, it is pat-
entable when included in part of a machine or article-of-manufacture
[that] would effectively supersede patent protection for all computer-related questionable
statutory subject matter, whether called an algorithm, method of doing business, printed
matter, or an abstract idea"); McDonald, supra note 3, 123 (calling for "guidance from
the legislature" and arguing that "policy decisions inherent in protecting software are sim-
ply too complicated to allow adequate solution through the [Federal Circuit's] legislating
from the bench"). Although Professor Stem's proposal is actually more of a usurpation of
the Patent Act than an amendment to the Act itself, it contains suggestions that are also
helpful in amending the Act itself.
325 For example, the business method and mathematical algorithm exceptions obfus-
cated the field for decades. See supra Part I.B-C.
326 See supra Part II.
327 On the other hand, the Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over pat-
ent matters gives every Federal Circuit patent decision considerable authority. See supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Federal Circuit's recent decision in
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58, 1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 368 (1999), reaffirms its commitment to uphold software patents that
meet the statutory requirements for patentability. However, the fundamental policy ques-
tions surrounding software patents demand a legislative solution, rather than reactive judi-
cial lawmaking.
328 Cf Stern, supra note 20, at 208 ("[State Street Bank's predecessors] in the Federal
Circuit have left algorithm-related and computer-related patent law in such disarray that,
without legislative intervention, it may be years before any equilibrium is reached. The out-
come of cases will now significantly depend on the happenstance of panel composition."
(emphasis added)). While State Street Bank is certainly a strong move toward certainty in
software patents, another Federal Circuit panel could just as easily reinstate the prior con-
fusion with a decision based on the now-defunct exceptions. However, in light of AT&Ts
extention of the State Street Bank rationale in upholding a process claim that implemented a
mathematical algorithm, see AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357-58, 1360, Stem's concerns may no
longer hold true. Arguably, AT&T indicates a shift in the Federal Circuit toward consis-
tent, favorable treatment of software patents. In any event, congressional ratification of
the State Street Bank and AT&T holdings would provide more reliable protection for
software.
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claim. Finally, and most desirably, Congress could indicate that
software itself constitutes patentable subject matter within the existing
framework of § 101.
Congress should not explicitly define algorithms and business
methods as statutory subject matter, because such categorization
would fail to acknowledge their nature as abstract ideas. As State Street
Bank notes, mathematical algorithms and business methods are not
patentable per se, but their useful applications are patentable.32 9 Sim-
ilarly, Congress should not legitimize software merely as an attach-
ment to machines or articles of manufacture. In addition to
needlessly limiting the scope of protection for software, such a formu-
lation would perpetuate the legal fictions and contortionist claim
drafting practices that have permeated mathematical algorithm juris-
prudence for the last three decades.330
Congress should instead revise the existing statutory framework
to ensure that otherwise patentable subject matter is not rendered un-
patentable solely because it contains a business method or mathemati-
cal algorithm. By doing so, Congress would not only establish a
consistent mode of subject matter analysis, it would also provide the
proper scope of protection to software-related inventions. These in-
ventions would be patentable, but only if they satisfied the require-
ments of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. Therefore, this Note
proposes the following amendment to § 101 of the Patent Act:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.33' So long as such an
invention or discovery conforms to the conditions and requirements of this
title, the fact that the invention or discovery contains or implements a busi-
ness method or mathematical algorithm shall not affect the eligibility of such
invention or discovery for patent protection under this title.33 2
Following the Federal Circuit's rationale,333 this amendment does
not distinguish between processes, machines, and articles of manufac-
ture. Moreover, the proposed amendment comports with the consti-
tutional requirement that all patented inventions be new and useful
by explicitly mandating compliance with other patentability require-
ments of the Patent Act, such as § 102 (utility) and § 103 (nonobvious-
329 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (requiring a claim embodying a mathematical algorithm or business
method to produce a "'useful, concrete, and tangible result'" in order to constitute statu-
tory patentable subject matter), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
330 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
332 The emphasized portion is the author's proposed amendment to § 101.
333 See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357-58; State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
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ness). By codifying the results of State Street Bank and AT&T, the
proposed amendment provides a dependable standard that courts,
the PTO, and inventors can rely on.
2. Streamline the Patent Application Process
Arguably, by simply codifying the results of State Street Bank and
AT&T, Congress will fully enable the patent system to effectively pro-
tect software. However, if it decides to amend the Patent Act, Con-
gress may also wish to take more substantial-and admittedly
controversial-action to fix the patent system's much criticized appli-
cation process, especially for software patent applications. As the
Manifesto points out, the protracted length of time between patent ap-
plication and issuance adversely affects the desirability of patent as the
primary mode of protection for software.33 4 In many cases, the ex-
tended examination period renders a software patent virtually useless
because the patented invention has become obsolete by the time the
patent issues. 33 5 Typically, patent prosecution takes a long time be-
cause the PTO has to search for the relevant prior art to make novelty
and obviousness determinations. Ironically, however, prior art in the
software field is largely undocumented and highly disorganized.3 36
334 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2345 n.134. The patent application and
examination process works as follows: First, the applicant submits a patent application to
the PTO. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PAT-
ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601 (7th ed. 1998) [hereinafter MPEP]. The application con-
tains both a specification (describing the invention and any prior art), see id. § 608.01, and
claims (describing, in explicit detail, the invention), see id. § 608.01(i). Next, the PTO
searches its databases for prior art that would render the claimed invention in the applica-
tion unpatentable. See id. § 704. If the PTO finds such prior art, it rejects some or all of
the application's claims. See id. § 706.02. The applicant may then amend the claims in
response to the examiner's rejections. See id. This process continues until the patent con-
forms to the examiner's requirements or the examiner issues a Final Rejection. See id.
§ 706.07. Following the Final Rejection, the applicant may either appeal to the PTO Board
of Appeals or abandon the application. See id. This iterative process is referred to as exam-
ination and typically lasts from several months to several years. Only after the completion
of the examination process will the patent issue, thereby conferring protection on the
invention. See id. § 701. For more details on the patent examination process, see id.
§§ 701-24.
335 See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2346 n.134. Professor Samuelson and her
coauthors note:
If and when a patent finally issues, it may... come after the useful commer-
cial life of the product embodying the innovation, because of the fast pace
of innovation in the industry. A form of legal protection for the first years
of a technical innovation in softvare would, accordingly, be better tailored
to the needs of software entrepreneurs.
Id.
336 Quoting from a 1966 report of the President's Commission on the Patent System,
Justice Douglas lamented on the inadequacy of the patent system in Bensorc " 'The Patent
Office now [in 1966] cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack of a
classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable
searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art
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Thus, the present examination procedure for software patent applica-
tions is both overly protracted and largely ineffective.
As a remedy to this gaping hole in the patent system, Professor
Richard Stem proposes a "petty-patent system." 337 Stern envisions the
petty patent as a system that would "direct the Commissioner [of the
PTO] to issue petty patents with only negligible prior examination,
which would be limited to facial compliance with statutory require-
ments and implementing regulations." 338 Professor Stem patterned
his proposal on the "utility-model" system recently implemented by
several countries-most notably Japan and Germany.339 Although it
would not be part of the existing patent system,3 40 Professor Stem's
system would still reside with the Patent Act in Tide 35 of the United
States Code.341 The proposed system is notable for the lack of an in-
volved pre-issuance examination process and the consequent negation
of the presumption of validity normally accorded to patents.3 42 To
being generated.'" Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (quoting PRESIDENT'S
COM'N ON THE PATENT SYs., "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF... USEFUL ARTS": IN AN AGE
OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 13 (1966). The situation has not improved since the 1960s.
With the explosive growth of the software industry and its use of trade secrecy to protect
much of its intellectual property, see supra Part III.A.1, much of the prior art in software
remains shrouded in obscurity, see Stem, supra note 20, at 216 n.144 (noting "the past
difficulty experienced in the [Patent and Trademark] Office in finding relevant prior art
in software cases"). For a discussion of more recent critiques of the PTO's ability to deal
with prior art in the software field, see supra note 260.
337 Stem, supra note 20, at 213.
338 Id. at 213; see also Richard H. Stem, A Sui Generis Utility Model Law as an Alternative
Legal Model for Protecting Software, 1 U. BAiT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 108, 112-13 (1993) (postulat-
ing that a petty-patent examination would not include an exhaustive iterative prosecution
process and thus the petty patent would issue more quickly and without "the high front-
end costs of a patent-type examination procedure").
339 See Stem, supra note 338, at 112 & n.6; see also Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent
Protection, 40 HARv. INT'L LJ. 151, 153 (1999) ("More than sixty countries currently offer
second tier [utility model] patent protection, including key patenting jurisdictions such as
Germany andJapan.... Most importantly, the European Commission is moving to expand
the role of second tier regimes at the pan-European level.").
340 See Stem, supra note 20, at 221 (calling for "a sharp, bright-line divide between the
respective domains of petty and regular patents").
341 Title 35 currently codifies only the Patent Act. See Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66
Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
342 See Stem, supra note 20, at 213-14 ("[Pletty patents [would issue] with only negligi-
ble prior examination, which would be limited to facial compliance with statutory require-
ments and implementing regulations .... That, in turn, implies a very slight presumption
of validity."). Section 282 of the Patent Act establishes a presumption of validity for issued
patents in infringement actions. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) ("A patent shall be presumed
valid."). Only clear and convincing evidence of invalidity will rebut this presumption. See
Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) ("A patent is presumed valid and the party asserting invalidity must overcome
this presumption by clear and convincing evidence establishing facts which support the
conclusion of invalidity."); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels, Inc., 908 F.2d 951,
953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Under § 282, a patent is presumed valid. This presumption of valid-
ity places the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of going forward on the party
asserting invalidity."). The presumption of validity is one of patent's primary sources of
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counteract this deficiency in the examination process, Professor Stem
proposes a more robust reexamination proceeding, in which inter-
ested parties can challenge the validity of the issued petty patent with-
out resort to expensive trials.343 Stem reasons:
The [exhaustive examination] procedure should be post-issuance,
rather than pre-issuance, in order not to delay prompt registration
of the subject matter and attachment of rights to the owner, and
opposers should be allowed to submit art to the Office, explain its
relevance, and controvert the owner's arguments as to the signifi-
cance of the art.344
Successful navigation of the post-issuance examination process would
presumably confer the traditional presumption of validity to petty
patents.
Multiple benefits would arise from conducting the post-issuance
examination proceeding. Examiners currently conduct the ex parte
pre-issuance examination proceedings in order to ensure the confi-
dentiality of the invention until the inventor secures patent protec-
tion.345 However, if the patent has already issued at the time of
examination, the PTO can utilize an inter partes proceeding, which
mirrors the current reexamination proceeding.346 This inter partes
proceeding would allow interested parties to introduce relevant prior
value, because it shifts the burden in an infringement action onto the alleged infringer to
prove invalidity as a defense.
343 See Stern, supra note 20, at 214-16 ("Post-registration administrative opposition (rev-
ocation) should also be available to permit those in the software industry to bring to the
[Patent and Trademark] Office's attention prior commercial software products that antici-
pate [or render invalid] a registered algorithm, rather than engage in infringement litiga-
tion." (footnotes omitted)). Under the current patent system, an interested party,
including the patentee, may file for a reexamination proceeding in the PTO in order to
introduce previously undisclosed relevant prior art and reexamine a patent in light
thereof. See MPEP, supra note 334, § 2212. During the reexamination proceeding, a pat-
ent examiner will issue a new determination of patent validity. See id. § 2258.
344 Stern, supra note 20, at 215 n.143.
345 Cf. Patent Applications Preserved in Confidence, 37 C.F.R1 § 1.14(a) (1999) ("No
information will be given concerning the filing, pendency, or subject matter of any applica-
tion for patent, and no access will be given to, or copies furnished of, any application or
papers relating thereto [with limited exceptions, such as if the application has been
abandoned].").
346 Congress recently enacted an optional inter partes reexamination procedure, effec-
tive November 29, 1999. See Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601-08, 113 Stat. 1501A-567, 1501A-567 to -572 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The inter partes reexamination will likely
allow the PTO to more easily find and evaluate the impact of relevant prior art on the
patent at issue, ensuring that fewer nonmeritorious patents are upheld. However, because
the patent system continues to implement the involved preissuance examination proce-
dure, the new reexamination does nothing to alleviate the major problem this Part seeks to
address: the unduly burdensome time and expense involved in obtaining a patent. In
contrast, Stem's proposal would vastly reduce the scope of the preissuance examination,
allowing patents to issue more quickly and with less expense. See supra notes 342-44 and
accompanying text.
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art to challenge the novelty, utility, or nonobviousness of the patented
invention.3 47 The inter partes nature of the proceeding would pro-
mote more comprehensive searches of the prior art, because prospec-
tive searchers would have a vested interest in finding prior art that
would invalidate the patent at issue.3 48 The inter partes proceeding
would also remove from the PTO the burden of searching the prior
art.34
9
The reduced time and expense of the pre-issuance prosecution
makes Professor Stem's petty-patent a facially appealing form of
software protection. The petty-patent proposal also addresses con-
cems about the issuance of patents for meritless inventions.350 Unfor-
tunately, however, theoretical and administrative deficiencies could
render Professor Stem's proposal as impractical as any other sui
generis protection scheme.351 Further, the most desirable feature of
Professor Stem's proposal, the post-issuance examination, could be
incorporated into the existing patent system.3 52 Therefore, if Con-
gress were to adopt such a procedure, it should do so within the cur-
rent patent system for all types of inventions.
Two primary premises motivate Professor Stem's advocacy
of a petty-patent system outside of the existing patent system.353
First, he contends that mathematical algorithms do not constitute
patentable subject matter, and thus the current patent system
should not accommodate them.354 In light of State Street
347 Most European countries provide for this type of inter partes, post-issuance exami-
nation. See Stem, supra note 20, at 215 n.143.
348 The parties searching for prior art are usually competitors of the patentee, seeking
to have the patent invalidated. Not only will they have a strong motivation to find relevant
prior art, they will also have a better access to that prior art (because they likely have
produced some of it) and be much more well versed in the relevant art than the patent
examiner.
349 The PTO has traditionally had a difficult time searching prior art in the software
field. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
350 See Stem, supra note 338, at 113 (describing "an intermediate level of required
technical merit" to which inventions must rise in order to qualify for petty-patent
protection).
351 See supra Part II A4 for a discussion of the practical impediments to sui generis
protection.
352 See supra notes 337-44 and accompanying text.
353 Professor Stem's proposal shares a similar rationale with Professor Samuelson's
Manifesto. See supra Part IIA4.
354 See Stem, supra note 20, at 224-25. Professor Stem advocates Fwok's "point-of-nov-
elty" approach, which Freeman, Walter, and ultimately Diehr rejected:
[My proposal] adopts the so-called point-of-novelty... approach in distin-
guishing petty patent subject matter from regular patent subject matter.
Under this approach, analysis focuses on how the claimed innovation is dif-
ferent from the prior art. If everything described in the claim is old and
conventional, except for a new algorithm (or other nonstatutory subject
matter), the claimed innovation is really a new algorithm.
Id. at 224, ef. supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
abandonment of the point of novelty approach in Diehr).
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Bank,355 however, Professor Stem's dogmatic reliance on the mathe-
matical algorithm exception to distinguish between software and
other inventions seems outmoded. Thus, the fact that mathematical
algorithms comprise an integral part of software inventions does not
justify a distinction between software patents and other types of
patents.
Second, Professor Stem proposes lower standards of utility, nov-
elty, and nonobviousness for petty patents than those required by the
current patent system.35 6 He presumably justifies the lower standards
by reasoning that most software advances, while meriting protection,
are not as inventive as other types of inventions. However, both legal
and economic arguments counsel against lowering the novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness requirements of the current system. Legally,
there is no distinguishing feature in software-related inventions that
merits departure from the traditional standards of inventiveness re-
quired by the Constitution.35 7 As previously discussed,358 the innova-
tion-invention dichotomy. suffers from analytical deficiencies.35 9
-55 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that an unpatentable claim consisting of a mathematical al-
gorithm would recite "merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths
that are not 'useful,'" but emphasizing that the presence of a mathematical algorithm, "in
and of itself, would not render [the claim] nonstatutory subject matter"), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1093 (1999).
356 See Stem, supra note 20, at 218-21. Professor Stern replaces the traditional trio of
patentability requirements with "originality, novelty, and technical merit advance." Id. at
218. His originality requirement, which replaces the nonobviousness requirement, "is es-
sentially the same as that for copyright law," id. at 220, and is thus de minimis, see CRAIG
JoYcE ET AL., COPRIGHT LAW 81 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that copyright's originality standard
requires only "independent creation by the author, and a modest quantum of creativity").
Professor Stern's "novelty requirement . . . is generally similar to that of patent law,
adapted to a system in which rights depend on filing" as opposed to the current patent
system's first-to-conceive standard. Stem, supra note 20, at 220 (footnote omitted). His
technical advance requirement "is not as high as that of patent law, and simply filters out
routine or commonplace contributions." Id. at 220. He further notes that "the term 'inno-
vation' used throughout (his discussion of technical advance requirement] simply means
the subject matter on which legal protection is sought and does not imply actual novelty
and technical merit; the term is analogous to 'alleged invention.'" Id. at 220-21.
357 See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966) (holding that the Constitu-
tion requires a minimum level of invention for patentability and that the standards embod-
ied in the current Patent Act correspond to that minimum level). Acknowledging his
deviation from traditional constitutional requirements, Professor Stem proposes congres-
sional enactment of the petty-patent system under the authority of the Constitution's Com-
merce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3, not its Patent Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See
Stem, supra note 20, at 216-17.
358 See supra notes 301-15 and accompanying text.
359 Like Professor Stem, the Manifesto argues that software advances are more often
innovative than inventive and asserts that the advances are so minor as not to qualify for
patent protection under the Patent Act's novelty, utility, and nonobviouness requirements.
See Samuelson et al., supra note 20, at 2331 & n.69 ("While innovation in program-design
occasionally rises to the level of invention, most often it does not.").
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One can also question the economic underpinnings of the utility
model of software protection.3 60 Initially, a patent system that pro-
vides certainty and security to software inventors will stimulate inven-
tive, and not just innovative, advances.3 61 Additionally, modem
programming practices not only encourage inventive advances, but
also promote easier identification and delimitation of patentable ad-
vances encompassed within larger, older programs by enabling mod-
ule segregation.3 62 Finally, software advances that do not meet the
patent system's requirements do not deserve monopoly protection.
Such advances already receive adequate market protection via lead
time advantages. 363 However, truly inventive software advances should
receive the more substantial protection of a government-sanctioned
monopoly. In sum, as Professor Janis notes, "second tier patent re-
gimes 'are hard to justify in terms of classical intellectual property the-
ory... ,' and.., the economicjustification for awarding protection to
subpatentable innovation ha[s] never been articulated
satisfactorily."3 64
Thus, there is no reason to segregate Professor Stem's post-issu-
ance examination proposal from the present patent system.365 After
all, even if the rapid pace of the software industry exacerbates the
arduous examination process, inventors of nonsoftware inventions
360 SeeJanis, supra note 339, at 209 (arguing that the issue of whether lowering the
inventiveness threshold "makes sense economically is... a highly contentious matter").
According to ProfessorJanis, the utility model depends on "the so-called 'prospect' theory
of the patent system," which argues, contrary to classical economic models of the patent
system, that granting patent protection at the early stage of invention will encourage inno-
vation by allowing the patentee to more readily finance the further development of the
invention. Id. at 209-10. However, the utility model "seem[s] to assume that the subject
matter of second tier applications will inevitably constitute modest variations on existing
technologies... [and] is fundamentally not a technological prospect arising early in the
course of development efforts." Id. at 211-12. Thus, the economic justification for the
petty-patent system is inconsistent with its goal of encouraging and rewarding merely inno-
vative, as opposed to inventive, developments.
361 See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
363 A software developer will receive some market exclusivity for its innovation simply
as a result of the amount of time required for other developers to imitate the innovation.
See Goldstein, supra note 259, at 2575 (speculating that one possible reason for the past
growth in the software industry despite the lack of comprehensive protection for software-
related advances might be the existence of "market niches [that) provided sufficient lead
time to support software innovation"). This Note argues that only advances rising to the
level of invention, as required by the Patent Act, merit the legal protection of monopoly
status. For mere innovations, lead-time advantages provide sufficient reward, and corre-
sponding incentive, to developers.
364 Janis, supra note 339, at 219 (quotingJ.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-
The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 797, 811 (1992)).
365 As Professor Hollaar notes, if software-specific complaints about inefficiencies of
the PTO "have merit, Congress should address them by reforming the patent system as a
whole, not by excluding one area of technology [from the patent system]." Hollaar, supra
note 259, at 285.
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likewise have to deal with the same high cost and delay of the current
system.
If Congress ultimately decides that the protracted length of time
between patent application and issuance sufficiently hinders the effec-
tiveness of the patent system's protection of software to justify legisla-
tive action, this Note recommends modification of the existing patent
system, rather than implementation of an entirely new, sui generis
protection scheme for software. One way to limit the duration of pat-
ent application pendency would be to replace the current examina-
tion system with a summary application procedure. Such a procedure
would diminish the time and expense currently required to obtain a
patent. To prevent frivolous patents, the amendments should require
comprehensive, inter partes, post-issuance examination proceedings,
notice of which would be published to the public. Because these pro-
ceedings would take place after patent issuance, they would provide
two key benefits: First, they would preclude delays associated with the
present patent application procedure. Second, they could proceed in-
ter partes, allowing interested parties to direct the Examiner to rele-
vant prior art and relieving the PTO of the difficult burden of
performing software prior art searches. The traditional presumption
of validity accorded to an issued patent would not inhere to a software
patent until it had undergone the post-issuance examination process.
Moving to a new system of patent examination will necessarily
create substantial administrative costs. Additionally, the inter partes
examination would probably be more expensive for the inventor than
the ex parte examination under the current system because of the
more adversarial nature of the proceeding. However, this increase in
expense would be an investment for the patent holder, as it would
presumably result in increased patent security; any opposing party
would have the opportunity to challenge the patent during the exami-
nation proceeding. In addition, deferring the examination costs until
after the patent issuance affords the inventor additional flexibility.
The inventor can gauge the value of the invention before deciding
whether to proceed with the examination; the inventor can also possi-
bly finance the examination with proceeds from marketing the pat-
ented article or negotiating technology licenses.
Whether the benefits of the post-issuance examination outweigh
the additional costs is an issue beyond the scope of this Note. How-
ever, in the event that Congress does decide to adopt a post-issuance,
inter partes examination system for software, it would be both feasible
and desirable for Congress to do so within the current patent system,
rather than as a sui generis scheme. In addition, constitutional con-
siderations militate against the lower inventiveness threshold common
to sui generis protection schemes.
1178 [Vol. 85:1118
ABORT, RETRY, FAIL
CONCLUSION
For purposes of intellectual property protection, software-related
inventions do not possess any special characteristics that distinguish
them from other forms of inventions. Thus, to qualify for protection
they should meet the constitutional threshold of inventiveness. The
patent system therefore represents the best mode of protection for
software-related inventions. Since the early 197 0s, however, the ten-
sion between the patent system and software-related inventions, and
the consequent uncertainty regarding the validity of software patents,
have prompted inventors and scholars to seek an alternative form of
protection for software.
Commentators have advocated several alternative protection
schemes for software-related inventions, including copyright, trade se-
crecy, trademark, and even sui generis protection schemes. Witness-
ing the explosive growth in the software industry over the last two
decades, some critics have even disavowed any form of protection for
software-related inventions. Like any other invention, however,
software merits protection, as long as it meets the requisite standards
of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
The federal government need not look any further than the cur-
rent patent system to provide the proper level of protection for
software-related inventions. In fact, the Federal Circuit's recent State
Street Bank decision represents a signpost on the path towards appro-
priate protection of software-related inventions: The presence of
amorphous concepts such as mathematical algorithms and business
methods in the patent's claims should not be determinative of patent-
ability. Instead, the patentability inquiry should focus on whether the
claimed invention produces a tangible result and meets the other re-
quirements of the Patent Act.
While State Street Bank provides insight, congressional amendment
of the Patent Act will make the patent system even more amenable to
software and provide the necessary guidance for the courts and cer-
tainty for developers.
This Note proposes two independent amendments to the Patent
Act that will allow the patent system to better accommodate software-
related inventions. First, the Patent Act should allow for the patenta-
bility of software qua software, and not merely as an attachment to a
machine or an article of manufacture. Second, in response to con-
cerns about the length of time the PTO takes to issue patents, Con-
gress should consider restructuring the application procedure to
defer the protracted examination period until after patent issuance.
The benefits of this change would be two-fold: It would promote more
expedient patent issuance and also allow inter partes examination, let-
ting interested parties introduce evidence relevant to the patentability
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determination. If Congress decides to implement such a procedure, it
should do so within the current patent system. There is simply no
sufficient justification for creating a special sui generis protection
scheme for software. State Street Bank has reemphasized the patent sys-
tem's ample ability to provide protection to software developers and
to enable them to share information and innovation in unprece-
dented fashion.
